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A bill that has passed the United States Senate, S. 744, proposes a “Lawful Prospective 
Immigrant” (LPI) status and a “path to Citizenship” for an estimated 11–12 million 
undocumented immigrants in the United States. United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) is the agency that would be responsible for processing 
applications for LPI status or other immigration benefits authorized by immigration 
reform legislation or administrative relief programs introduced by the White House. 
Current agency receipts of applications for immigration benefits range between 6 and 7 
million per year. Depending on the eligibility criteria for new immigration benefits, 
agency receipts could triple. The operational impact of these legislative or executive 
actions on USCIS could bear significant national security risks.  
This study evaluates whether the implementation of automated tools would 
mitigate external operational impacts on USCIS. Two existing automated systems are 
studied. The Secure Flight system, operated by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), and the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) as 
utilized in the Joint Reform Effort (JRE) were selected for their complexity, maturity, and 
similarity to immigration adjudications. This analysis demonstrates that automated tools 
can improve the quality of immigration adjudications by supporting a comprehensive 
assessment, including accuracy, timeliness, completeness and validity. Further, 
automation would improve the agency’s operational responsiveness when external factors 
such as policy changes affect workloads. These factors thereby improve national security 
by supporting the agency’s mission to uphold the integrity of the immigration system and 
to prevent and intercept illicit actors from entering or remaining in the United States. 
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External factors affecting immigration adjudication procedures, such as the 
implementation of Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) or presidentially issued 
Administrative Relief (AR), will significantly impact operational efficiency at United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Currently, USCIS conducts 
manual background checks and other records checks of immigration benefit applicants. 
The estimated impact of CIR or AR on current agency operations is potentially 
paralyzing. The resulting slow processing times may mean that background 
investigations on applicants are not conducted in a thorough or timely fashion, thus 
permitting those who seek to harm the United States easier entry into the country. This 
will impact our national security.  
This thesis examines the potential benefits and costs of utilizing automation tools 
and decision support systems in the immigration adjudications process. Two existing 
cases are studied: Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Secure Flight and 
the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Automated Continuous Evaluation System 
(ACES). These systems became prioritized only after major security issues—the attacks 
of 9/11 and the Navy Yard shooting—highlighted poor operations. Congress mandated 
improvements to aviation security and the security clearance process through the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRPTA) of 2004, in part to enact 
several recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. The Navy Yard Shooting 
brought new attention to the effort for Security Clearance Reform.1 Operational 
improvements to immigration adjudications processes through the implementation of 
automation tools must be prioritized before a major security incident requires them.  
In 2003, changes in immigration adjudications procedures mandated additional 
background checks and expanded the range of applicants that were required to submit 
1 Jack Moore. Federal News Radio Online. “White House backs 13 recommendations to improve 
security clearance process.” March 19 2014. http://www.federalnewsradio.com/520/3585372/White-House-
backs-13-recommendations-to-improve-security-clearance-process . 
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fingerprints and other biometrics in support of their applications.2 These operational 
changes resulted in a peak backlog of 3.85 million cases by January 2004.3 The agency 
continued to conduct operations manually, and it reduced the backlog by utilizing 
overtime resources. A backlog of 3.85 million cases represents a little more than half of 
the agency’s current workload of 6 to 7 million cases per year.  
An approximation of the potential workload impact of CIR or AR must take into 
consideration the compound nature of the process to adjudicate applications. The initial 
influx of applications could be 11–12 million,4 however, evidentiary requirements, 
supplementary applications for employment authorization, reapplications, potential 
adjustments of status to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), and potential Citizenship 
applications compound the issue of simply tripling receipts of applications. Each of these 
applications also requires USCIS adjudication resources to process, thus supporting the 
prediction of a permanent increase in the agency’s workload.  
Though using overtime resources was successful in 2004 for eliminating a 
backlog of an additional 50% of the typical workload, it would have little effect on a 
growing backlog of this magnitude. A permanent increase in staffing levels is not a long-
term strategy for optimizing the agency’s operations and improving national security. The 
policy of developing and implementing a decision support tool to automatically check 
national security systems and other records systems is supported by the findings of this 
analysis. 
The fundamental factors for evaluating the policy decision to implement 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures are: 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Backlog Elimination Plan: Fiscal Year 2006, 3rd Quarter Update. (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, December 11, 2006). http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/backlog_FY06Q3.pdf . 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Backlog Elimination Plan: Fiscal Year 2006, 3rd Quarter Update. (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, December 11, 2006). http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/backlog_FY06Q3.pdf.  
4 Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. “Population Decline of Unauthorized 




                                                 
•  Expected benefits to stakeholders;  
• Potential improvements in operational efficiency, and; 
• Potential reduction of risks to national security. 
These factors are evaluated as substantially demonstrated by both Secure Flight 
and ACES. These systems each offer a strong and suitable comparison to immigration 
adjudications. The model suggested by these case studies involves the use of automated 
rules-based querying of an individual’s identifying information on multiple national 
security systems and a “case-flagging strategy” that sorts cases with adverse or 
derogatory information for further review. This model appears to optimize the 
distribution of operational resources, thus improving national security. This model is 
evaluated as valid for immigration adjudications, and the factors could be substantially 
achieved if the model is implemented at USCIS. 
Recommendations: 
1) USCIS should develop automation tools for immigration adjudications 
regardless of the status of immigration reform or other immigration policy changes. 
Changes in agency workload can be affected by many external factors, including 
the addition of new benefit types per new law or executive order; international crises 
(war, political unrest, natural disasters, or other) that affect immigration patterns; 
seasonal or cyclical increases in application receipts; and many others. This analysis 
shows that automated tools to support adjudication and investigative procedures can 
improve operational responsiveness to such factors. The agency could realize benefits for 
operational efficiency and national security by implementing automation tools even in the 
absence of immigration reform. 
2) If the Congress or the President makes changes to immigration policy, funding 
specifically to support the development of automation tools at USCIS should be 
allocated. 
Given the cost and challenge of developing an automation tool, resource 
constraints at USCIS will limit progress towards its implementation. Current efforts to 
 xix 
develop an electronic application, a case management system, and the adjudications 
platform called “USCIS ELIS” under the Transformation Program are significantly 
behind original plans, both in schedule and budget. While automated records checks 
could reasonably fit into the development of USCIS ELIS, the funding and resources to 
build it properly would be evaluated for priority among all other agency information 
technology efforts.  
Operational inefficiencies or customer service problems that are likely to arise 
due to the expected workload impact of CIR or AR could provide the agency with 
leverage for additional funding to develop and implement an automation tool. However, 
such an operational efficiency gap would pose a significant national security risk. 
Therefore, Congress or the White House should fund the development of an automation 
tool for immigration adjudications in conjunction with significant changes to immigration 
policy or procedure. 
 xx 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, or “the Agency”) 
processes between 6 and 7 million applications or petitions for immigration benefit 
requests each year. These include requests for visitor or student visas, temporary work 
permits, family-based petitions such as legal permanent residency for foreign spouses, 
and citizenship requests, among others. Depending on the type of request, each petition or 
application requires an adjudication or decision based on a review of information related 
to the applicant or petitioner. Information on the applicant or petitioner or his/her 
dependents is either provided on the request form or collected by the USCIS adjudicator 
from government or other sources. Criteria for granting immigration benefit requests are 
based in policies from the Agency and other governing bodies, including statutes and 
regulations such as the Immigration and Nationality Act (1952) and Title 8 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (commonly referred to as “8 CFR”), field and administrative 
manuals, handbooks and operations instructions, published precedent decisions, and 
memoranda and cables specifically designated as policy. Occasionally, official 
correspondences from USCIS headquarters or Members of Congress may affect 
adjudications. The Agency spends significant resources to process immigration benefit 
requests. In addition to Agency operational resources, immigration benefit requests 
require the time of trained adjudicators, background check officers, fraud officers, 
verification officers, records clerks, and others to process. 
Decades ago, information necessary to adjudicate immigration benefit requests 
was stored throughout several government agencies in paper files. More recently, 
electronic systems to improve the storage and retrieval of information were developed 
and deployed throughout USCIS and other agencies. These systems can generally be 
categorized as “database systems” (DBSs). DBSs also enabled the creation, storage, and 
usage of new data in the adjudications process. Use of this additional data may lead to 
 1 
improved adjudications.1 However, this explosion of data and the associated DBSs have 
required adjudicators to retrieve information from multiple database systems in order to 
conduct thorough investigations. As a result, processing immigration benefit requests 
requires general familiarity with several DBSs, including their contents and structure, the 
query language for each system, their location on a network, access to that network if a 
database resides outside USCIS, and more. Each adjudicator must break down each 
investigation into a series of retrieval tasks, conduct queries of several sources, and then 
temporarily store, transfer, or synthesize intermediate results. Furthermore, the DBS 
landscape is continually changing. As systems are upgraded, replaced, or retired, 
adjudicators must continuously learn new systems, new query languages, new contents 
structures, and the interpretation of new results.  
Compounding the problems associated with querying multiple DBSs are external 
factors that may affect Agency workload or procedures. For example, the Agency 
redesigned the N-400 “Application for Naturalization.” Prior to its public release, there 
was a spike in receipts of applications on the existing form, resulting in a temporary 
increase in workload. As another example, Agency procedures were impacted by changes 
in laws and regulations due to the heightened national security environment after the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Changes in adjudications procedures in 2003 
mandated additional background checks and expanded the range of applicants that were 
required to submit fingerprints and other biometrics in support of their applications.2 
These operational changes resulted in a peak backlog of 3.85 million cases in January 
2004.3 
The United States Congress is currently evaluating Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform (CIR) legislation. If CIR passes, it would significantly affect both Agency 
workload and procedures. A bill that has already passed the United States Senate, S. 
1 Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson. “Big Data: The Management Revolution.” Harvard Business 
Review, 90, no. 10 (October 2012): 60–68. 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
“Backlog Elimination Plan.” Fiscal Year 2006, 3rd Quarter Update. (Washington, DC: Department of 




                                                 
744,4 proposes a “Lawful Prospective Immigrant” (LPI) status that would provide a “path 
to Citizenship” for an estimated 11–12 million undocumented immigrants5 in the United 
States. As with other immigration benefits, applications for LPI or any other status 
created by CIR would be processed by USCIS. Agency leaders estimate that the current 
workload of 6 to 7 million applications per year would immediately triple in the year 
following the implementation of CIR.6 Additionally, they estimate that steady-state 
workload would be about double the current level due to reapplications, adjustments of 
status, and eventual naturalization applications for the newly eligible LPI population. 
When CIR becomes a reality, an overwhelming caseload will compound the challenge 
that USCIS adjudicators and other employees currently face in evaluating immigration 
benefits requests by querying a significant number of databases to answer questions 
related to an application.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the general procedures for processing an immigration 
benefit request. 
4 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.744, 113th Cong., 
1st sess. (2013). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s744es/pdf/BILLS-113s744es.pdf . 
5 Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. “Population Decline of Unauthorized 
Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed.” Pew Research Hispanic Trends Report. September 23, 2013. 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-
reversed/. 
6 An approximation of the workload impact of S.744 must take into consideration the compound 
nature of the process that would be created to support Lawful Prospective Immigrant (LPI) status, 
involving initial applications for status and work authorization, as well as status reapplications and 
citizenship applications as outlined in the Bill. The initial influx of applications could be 11–12 million; 
however, the evidentiary requirements of LPI status and the supplementary application for employment 
authorization compound the issue of simply tripling receipts. Furthermore, the Bill requires reapplication 
after 6 years, thus increasing the workload baseline. LPIs become eligible to apply for citizenship after 10 
years, and naturalized U.S. Citizens become eligible to petition for family members to immigrate or adjust 
status to lawful permanent residents. Each of these procedures requires USCIS adjudication resources, thus 
supporting the prediction of a permanent increase in the Agency’s workload. 
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Figure 1.  Immigration Benefit Request Processing Overview 
 4 
A technological tool to automate certain database queries might address some of 
the operational impact of CIR. In the absence of CIR, such a tool might simply improve 
existing processing times for immigration adjudications and reduce risks to national 
security in the current environment and in response to external factors. Categorized as 
“decision support systems,” (DSS) tools to aid in immigration adjudications could be 
described as the integration of authoritative DBSs coupled with algorithms that perform 
automated queries and evaluate query results. Depending on the type of benefit request 
being adjudicated, an automated querying tool could provide varying levels of decision 
support. For complicated applications, such as the N-400 “Application for 
Naturalization,” which require an interview in addition to background and system checks, 
a DSS tool might query systems for information on the applicant and then present results 
to an immigration officer for review with adverse information flagged or otherwise 
highlighted. For less complex adjudications, such as the I-539 “Application To Extend/
Change Nonimmigrant Status,” or extensions of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 
certain asylees, an automated DSS might be able to fully qualify complete applications 
with little or no adverse information. That is, a DSS could query DBSs using rules based 
on current policy and regulations, evaluate the results, and significantly reduce the human 
resources required for adjudications. The system could also identify applications with 
significant adverse information, focusing in-depth human review on high-risk or complex 
cases.  
USCIS is challenged with balancing the tasks of appropriately adjudicating 
immigration benefit requests and welcoming lawful immigrants with enhancing national 
security by limiting fraud and preventing the admission of those who intend harm. As 
identified in Mission 3 of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR),7 USCIS 
plays a key role in reaching the goals of effectively and efficiently administering 
immigration laws; providing prompt and accurate adjudications; preventing fraud, abuse, 
and exploitation; eliminating systemic vulnerabilities; and preventing the entry of 
criminals or dangerous foreign nationals. Meeting these challenges requires operational 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (QHSR). (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
February 2010). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf . 
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efficiency. However, both the current multi-system procedures and the potential impact 
of CIR threaten the Agency’s capacity to operate effectively and meet these goals. 
Technology-based decision support tools such as automated querying could improve the 
Agency’s capacity to meet these goals. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main field of research that this study builds upon is Decision Support 
Systems (DSS). The literature on DSS is mature and vast. Shim et al. provide a review of 
over three decades of DSS research beginning with its evolution in the 1960s and 1970s 
from two areas—theoretical studies of organizational decision-making and technical 
applications and designs.8 As pointed out by Shim et al., the original concept of DSS that 
was based on early research by Anthony,9 Gorry and Morton,10 and Simon11 describes 
types of problems, management activities, and decisions. Simon describes a model 
spectrum of decision problems from “programmed” to “nonprogrammed,” while Gorry 
and Morton use the terms “structured,” “unstructured,” and “semi-structured” for their 
model. Their research supports the development of DSS to deal with the structured 
portions of a problem with remaining “unstructured” parts reserved for a human decision-
maker. 
This area of literature is relevant to the investigation of integrating technology and 
DSS into the processing and adjudication of applications for LPI status. In this decision 
process, many of the business rules are well known, regulated, and understood. The 
decision of granting status would conceivably fall towards the “programmed” or 
“structured” end of the spectrum. This literature also supports the idea of a problem-
solving system that involves a hybrid of technology and human decision-making. 
8 J. P. Shim, Merrill Warkentin, James F. Courtney, Daniel J. Power, Ramesh Sharda, and Christer 
Carlsson. “Past, Present, and Future of Decision Support Technology.” Decision Support Systems 33, no. 2 
(2002): 111–126. 
9 R.N. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1965). 
10 George A. Gorry and Michael S. Morton. “A Framework for Management Information Systems.” 
Sloan Management Review 13, no. 1 (1971): 50–70. 
11 Herbert A. Simon. “The New Science of Management Decision,” in The Ford Distinguished 
Lectures, Volume 3. (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1960). 
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Jelassi, Jarke, and Stohr (1985) provide a very basic summary of the advantages 
of multiple criteria decision support systems (MCDSS), such as their ability to support 
the analysis of multiple criteria at once in an interactive way. MCDSS is the branch of 
decision support that is the most relevant to immigration adjudications since there are 
several system checks that an applicant would have to pass to qualify for benefits. Jelassi 
et al. suggest that reasonable models can be developed to appropriately address semi-
structured problems (like immigration benefit requests) with such a system.12 Beyond 
laying out the criteria for a system, they do not provide any further argument as to why 
this kind of system is beneficial. The question of the appropriateness of DSS in a 
homeland security environment requires further investigation. 
What appears to be largely missing from the academic literature is an evaluation 
of automated intelligent querying of heterogeneous datasets in the homeland security 
enterprise. Ceruti, Wilcox, and Powers (2004) purport that to maximize the utility of 
knowledge management systems, “the knowledge in the system must be abstracted, 
structured, and otherwise clustered in a suitable manner that facilitates its understanding, 
verification, validation, maintenance, management, testing and interoperability.”13 They 
offer types of data analysis techniques such as clustering or partitioning that could be 
performed on knowledge management systems in the context of military command and 
control. They touch on the subject of integrated systems, suggesting that participants in a 
system must develop policies for supplying and extracting data.14 
A significant amount of technical and analytical literature exists in areas of 
research related to the tools being evaluated in this thesis. The literature on decision 
support systems is at least 30 years deep. However, applications related to homeland or 
national security do not appear frequently or in-depth in academic literature. Research to 
evaluate automated background checking or other government information sharing 
12 Mohamed Tawfik Jelassi, Matthias Jarke and Edward A. Stohr. “Designing a Generalized Multiple-
Criteria Decision Support System.” Journal of Management Information Systems 1 (Spring 1985):4. 
13 M.G. Ceruti, D.R. Wilcox, and B. Powers. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, 
CA. “Knowledge Management for Command and Control.” Paper for the 2004 Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium, June 15–17, 2004. 
14 Ibid. 
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activities is not fully explored. The use of decision support tools for homeland or national 
security requires further investigation and analysis. 
Several documents related to the government programs analyzed in the case 
studies of this thesis were analyzed. These include reports from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO); the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the 
Inspector General (DHS OIG); DHS component offices, including the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS); the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General; reports from 
the White House; official testimonies before the Congress; presentations made by 
government officials at conferences; public government websites; reports from the news 
media; and various other public reports. These are cited as appropriate. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The central question of this thesis is whether national security could be improved 
by using decision support systems in immigration adjudications. This thesis will attempt 
to evaluate whether DSS in the form of automated queries would improve the quality of 
adjudications by supporting a comprehensive assessment, including accuracy, timeliness, 
completeness and validity. This thesis will also attempt to evaluate whether automation 
would improve the Agency’s operational responsiveness when external factors such as 
policy changes affect workloads. If demonstrated, these factors would improve national 
security by supporting the Agency’s mission to uphold the integrity of the immigration 
system and prevent and intercept illicit actors from entering or remaining in the United 
States. 
Throughout this thesis, “automation” and DSS refer to the automatic querying of 
existing data sources to support immigration adjudications. As previously noted, the 
adjudication of benefit requests vary in their level of complexity. As a result, complete 
automation of adjudication procedures would apply to few immigration benefit request 
types. 
Several government agencies in the United States and abroad utilize decision 
support systems to automate certain adjudicative procedures. Because actual testing of 
 8 
automation and DSS for immigration adjudications would require its development and 
implementation, the proposal of utilizing such systems cannot be studied directly. This 
thesis will examine two existing decision support systems as proxies for analysis. The 
decision support systems in this analysis were selected for their complexity, maturity, and 
similarity to immigration adjudications.  
The following two cases will be analyzed: 
Secure Flight (Transportation Security Administration) 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) utilizes its “Secure Flight” 
program to adjudicate a passenger’s ability to fly on a commercial airline. It uses 
automated business rules and searches of databases and watch lists.15 In addition, TSA 
passenger screening program, called “Pre✔” (“pre-check”), utilizes risk data from Secure 
Flight to sort passengers for expedited or enhanced screening.  
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) (Department of Defense) 
ACES is an automated pilot project that can query over 40 different government 
and commercial database records to evaluate the behavior of previously cleared personnel 
during reinvestigation.16 
As is discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this analysis, there are significant 
reasons why each of these systems offers a strong and suitable comparison to 
immigration adjudications. First, the general procedures are similar. Each of the cases, as 
well as immigration adjudications, follows a general process of application, 
investigation, adjudication, and post-decision activity. Second, automation and decision 
support tools are used to support the same step in the overall process: investigation. 
Third, each of the two case systems utilizes rules-based querying of an individual’s 
identifying information on multiple national security systems. Finally, a “case-flagging 
strategy” is used in each of the cases that appears to optimize the distribution of 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Program.” http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secureflight-program. (Accessed January 21, 2014). 
16 Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC). “Current Initiatives.” 
http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/currentinitiatives.html. (Accessed June 24, 2014). 
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operational resources. This model, if valid, would be appropriate to utilize for 
immigration adjudications to improve operational efficiency, thus improving national 
security. 
For each of the cases studied, the benefits and costs of automation and DSS will 
be analyzed with respect to stakeholders, Agency or other government operations, and 
national security objectives. The cases will be examined in Chapters II and III. 
Each of the case studies will examine the following: 
• What are the benefits and costs of automation to important program 
stakeholders? 
• What operational efficiencies do the respective agencies gain from 
automation in each case study? What implementation costs are required 
for each system? 
• What reductions or increases in risk to national security are attributable to 
the implementation of automation and decision support systems in each 
case study?  
Chapter IV will relate the findings of costs and benefits in the case studies to the 
immigration adjudications process. Drawing on the similarities of the processes and 
recommended use of automation for immigration adjudications, the following questions 
will be addressed: 
• What benefits, costs, and operational efficiencies could be realized if 
automation was utilized in immigration benefits adjudication?  
• Would risks to national security decrease or increase by automating 
immigration adjudications?  
These elements are fundamental factors that must be considered when evaluating 
the policy decision to implement automation tools for immigration adjudication 
procedures. As will be shown in each of the cases, the resources required to implement 
automation and decision support tools are significant. Hundreds of millions of dollars 
have been invested in each of the cases, and a similar investment would be required for 
immigration adjudications. Substantial benefits to stakeholders, improvements to 
operational efficiency, and the reduction of risks to national security would justify the 
 10 
expenditure of resources to develop automation tools. If these can be shown, they would 
support the policy of implementing automation tools for immigration adjudications. 
When available, dollar value estimates or actual development costs for decision 
support tools will be provided. However, the dollar value of many of the benefits and 
costs of automation in the examined cases is difficult to quantify and will be difficult to 
ascribe to the costs and benefits associated with DSS/automation for immigration 
adjudications.  
Quantifying the value of national security benefits is particularly challenging 
because estimating the cost of events prevented requires an understanding of risks that 
may only be available to the intelligence community. The scope of this analysis will not 
include a dollar value for these types of benefits.  
Despite these challenges in ascribing dollar values to costs and benefits, this 
analysis remains constructive for evaluating the policy decision of implementing 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures. Government activity is unlike 
certain endeavors in private industry where “return on investment” must be shown, or 
where profit must be made or shareholder value increased in order to sustain that 
endeavor. Government activity may not always involve a full cost-benefit analysis prior 
to implementation. 
 11 
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II. SECURE FLIGHT CASE STUDY 
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
Secure Flight is the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) program for 
aviation security whereby passenger information is matched against information of 
individuals with known or suspected links to terrorism. The purpose of matching 
passenger information is to improve aviation and national security by preventing 
suspected or known terrorists from boarding aircraft either bound for or operating within 
the United States. The volume of air travel to or within the United States requires that 
Secure Flight prescreens an average of 2 million passengers every day.17 Because of this 
volume, automation of the matching and alerting process is essential for the program’s 
success. 
B. PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (“the 9/11 Commission”) recommended improvements to national security. Key 
recommendations for aviation security were to improve the system of matching passenger 
information to terror watch lists and to use expanded lists for match confirmation when 
needed.18  
The 9/11 Commission recommended that watch list matching be performed by the 
federal government rather than by aircraft operators. Under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
section 114 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA),19 passed 
by Congress in 2004, this recommendation became a law that requires the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to perform this national security function. Between 2004 and 
17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94)(Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
18 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report.  (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). 
19 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat. 
3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o et. 
seq. 
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2008, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed, tested, and 
implemented a program called “Secure Flight” to meet this mandate. The Secure Flight 
Final Rule, issued October 28, 2008, provided the regulatory authority for the full 
implementation of the Secure Flight program.20 As of November 2010, TSA has fully 
assumed the function of watch-list matching from private air carriers.21 
Secure Flight now conducts automated prescreening of airline passengers for all 
covered U.S. and foreign flights into, out of, and within the United States, including 
point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. airlines and flights that overfly, but 
do not land in, the continental United States.22 The Secure Flight automated system uses 
pre-programmed query logic23 to match passenger names against the No Fly and Selectee 
lists.24 According to Secure Flight program procedures, an individual who is matched to 
the No Fly List is to be prevented from boarding an aircraft, and an individual who is 
matched to the Selectee List is to be inspected with enhanced screening procedures.25  
1. The No Fly and Selectee Lists 
The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB) that is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).26 The Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC)27 pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive–6 (HSPD–6), 
published in September 2003. HSPD–6 mandated that the “Attorney General shall 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Code of Federal Regulations, Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Secure Flight 
Records, title 49, sec. 1507. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_nprm_tsa_secureflight.pdf.  
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
25 Ibid. 
26 U.S Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO-
09-292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292. 
27 Ibid.  
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establish an organization to consolidate the Government’s approach to terrorism 
screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information 
processes.”28 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive–11, issued in August 2004, clarified the 
intended contents of the TSDB as information about “individuals known or reasonably 
suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid 
of, or related to terrorism.”29 Such individuals are commonly referred to as “known or 
reasonably suspected terrorists” (KST).  
The inclusion criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists are sensitive or classified 
and not available in public documents. A redacted report from the Department of 
Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG) in 2009 indicates “the 
requirements are considerably more stringent than the TSDB’s known or reasonably 
suspected standard.”30 The process for nomination of individuals to the TSDB is itself 
complex and scrutinized.31 The “stringent” requirements for the inclusion of an 
individual on the No Fly or Selectee lists may be due to public concern for privacy or 
misidentification. 
2. Program Mission 
The mission of the Secure Flight program is to strengthen the security of 
commercial air travel into, out of, within, and over the United States 
through the use of improved and expanded watch list matching using risk-
based security measures. 
–Secure Flight Overview, Transportation Security Administration.32 
28 White House. Homeland Security Presidential Directive–6: Integration and Use of Screening 
Information to Protect Against Terrorism. (September 16, 2003). 
29 White House. Homeland Security Presidential Directive–11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related 
Screening Procedures. (August 27, 2004). 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Role of the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation (redacted version). OIG-09-64, (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2009). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_09-
64_Jul09.pdf. 
31 Ibid. 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
 15 
                                                 
The recommendation by the 9/11 Commission that the federal government 
assumes responsibility for watch list matching and the subsequent legislation provided by 
the IRTPA was intended to improve aviation security. Prior to the implementation of 
Secure Flight, individual airlines conducted watch list matching using a watch list 
provided by TSA and their own matching processes.33 Static versions of watch lists were 
distributed,34 and the airlines were entrusted with the task of screening passenger 
information and inhibiting matched passengers from boarding aircraft. Because each 
aircraft operator conducted its own processes, matching results, threat assessments, and 
the coordination of law enforcement responses were not consistent across the aviation 
industry.35 By assuming watch list matching responsibilities from private airlines, TSA 
was tasked with meeting several goals for improved efficacy and security related to 
aviation security. These include: 
1. Eliminating inconsistencies in the passenger watch list matching 
procedures conducted by air carriers and authorizing the use of a larger set 
of watch-list records when necessary; 
2. Providing earlier identification of potential matches, allowing for 
expedited notification to law enforcement for coordinated efforts; 
3. Providing a fair, equitable, and consistent matching process across all 
airlines; 
4. Reducing the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive watch-list 
information or compromised watch list data by limiting its distribution; 
5. Protecting passengers’ personal information from unauthorized use and 
disclosure by adhering to Privacy Act regulations; and 
 
 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
34 Ibid.  
35 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Office of 
Acquisition. “Official Solicitation for the TSA Secure Flight Resolution Center, call center support.” 
Solicitation No. HSTS02-08-R-TTC159. July 3, 2008. https://www.fbo.gov/
index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=ed9d723a863da7938300737ab3358e07. 
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6. Reducing the number of individuals who are improperly identified as 
being on the No Fly or Selectee list through consistent logic and the 
integration of information from Department of Homeland Security’s 
Travel Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) so that individuals are less 
likely to be improperly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.36 
 
C. USE OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Under the Secure Flight program, passengers are required to provide Secure 
Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) including their full name (as it appears on the government-
issued identification they plan to use when traveling), date of birth, gender and their 
redress number (if applicable) to the airline when making a reservation.37 The airline 
submits SFPD to Secure Flight which vets it through an automated matching system. This 
automated system is a collection of hardware and Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
software designed to support the requirements of the Secure Flight program.38 The 
Secure Flight system matches SFPD against government watch lists including the No Fly, 
Selectee, and Expanded Selectee Lists; Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 
Automated Targeting System—Passenger List; the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention Do Not Board Lists; as well as the DHS TRIP Cleared List and Trusted 
Traveler Programs, such as Global Entry, SENTRI and NEXUS.39 Secure Flight 
integrates these DHS redress results into the watch list matching process to help prevent 
delays of misidentified passengers.40 
36 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO- 
09–292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292.  
37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Frequently Asked 
Questions—Secure Flight.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/content/frequently-asked-questions-
secure-flight. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Office of 
Acquisition. “Official Solicitation for the TSA Secure Flight Resolution Center, call center support.” 
Solicitation No. HSTS02-08-R-TTC159. July 3, 2008. https://www.fbo.gov/
index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=ed9d723a863da7938300737ab3358e07. 
39 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx. (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
40 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
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For national security purposes, the exact matching logic and querying tools used 
by Secure Flight are not available in public documents. Publishing the details of watch 
list matching measures as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities of the watch list 
matching process could enable targeted individuals to evade detection and thereby 
impede efforts to ensure transportation security.41  
However, from a variety of sources including multiple Government 
Accountability Office reports,42 an economic impact analysis43 of the Secure Flight Final 
Rule, and a report from the DHS Office of the Inspector General,44 it is known that TSA 
conducted significant testing of a variety of name-matching technologies to determine the 
best tools, query logic, and passenger information requirements for the operational 
Secure Flight Program. The testing was conducted using historical passenger name record 
data from 27 airlines and a copy of the TSDB.45 It can also be determined from these 
reports that TSA tested a variety of name-matching tools and a variety of combinations of 
passenger data from the samples provided by commercial airlines.46 The operational 
testing goals compared the efficacy of Secure Flight’s automated watch list matching 
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. Privacy Act of 
1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Secure Flight Records. 49 CFR Part 1507. http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_nprm_tsa_secureflight.pdf. 
42 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 
Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. (GAO-06-864T) (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-864T.  
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management. Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version), (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf.  
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management. Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
46 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version), (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
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rates with benchmarks set by aircraft operators47 and included minimizing false positive 
matches and assuring that matches were made within error thresholds.48 Furthermore, 
TSA conducted tests to determine the least and best amount of information to collect 
from passengers in order to minimize false negatives. That is, these tests determined the 
least amount of information necessary to collect to achieve efficacy benchmarks. These 
benchmarks are sensitive or classified and not available in public documents. TSA tested 
and compared sample sets of passenger name records (PNR) from multiple airlines. 
These samples revealed that there was considerable diversity in the information that was 
collected and in the way airlines and travel agents were storing it. These tests helped TSA 
determine a standardized format for collecting passenger names to ensure consistent and 
accurate watch list matching across all airlines.49 
TSA determined that standardizing PNR data collected from passengers to include 
their date of birth and gender would greatly improve the performance of the name-
matching technology by reducing false positives, that is, the number of passengers 
misidentified as a match to the watch list.50 At the end of the testing, TSA determined 
that a passenger’s full name, date of birth, and gender are “the minimum amount of 
personal information necessary to conduct effective watch list matching.”51 Collections 
of these elements for all passengers on covered flights was federally mandated in the 
47 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 
Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. (GAO-06-864T) (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-864T. 
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
50 NBS News.com. “How Secure Flight Works.” http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39892975/ns/travel-
travel_tips/t/how-secure-flight-works/.  (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
51 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
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Secure Flight Final Rule set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations under Title 49, parts 
1540 and 1560, and published in the Federal Register Volume 73, Number 209.52  
The supporting procedures for data submission, match verification, and 
coordination of efforts are available in public documents. The following is a summary of 
those procedures. 
Aircraft operators must submit SFPD electronically to Secure Flight. Most major 
air carriers with automated reservation systems (ARS) connect to and transmit passenger 
data through a DHS portal.53 For aircraft operators with manual reservation systems, 
Secure Flight has a web application called “eSecure Flight.” Because manual data entry is 
required to use this system, most major airlines use the direct DHS portal. Many smaller 
air carriers use eSecure Flight.54 
An aircraft operator cannot print a passenger’s boarding pass until it receives a 
cleared “boarding pass printing result” (BPPR) from Secure Flight. Secure Flight’s 
automated watch list matching program is responsible for pre-screening an average 2 
million passengers every day. The vast majority of SFPD information is automatically 
cleared by the system, with an average response time of 8.67 seconds for low-priority 
records and 2.01 seconds for high-priority records.55 For cleared passengers whose 
information does not match watch lists, Secure Flight transmits this information to 
airlines so they may issue boarding passes.56 
The Secure Flight program has also standardized the procedures for validating 
and coordinating a response in the event of a watch list match. The procedures require 
manual review and validation to minimize false positives and to ensure that legitimate 
52 Code of Federal Regulations, Secure Flight Program; Final Rule, title 49, sec. 154. October 28, 
2008. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-10-28/html/E8-25432.htm. 
53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 




56 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program . 
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members of the traveling public are distinguished from known or suspected terrorists 
(KST).57 If a potential match is made by the Secure Flight automated system, the aircraft 
operator will receive a negative BPPR and be prevented from printing a boarding pass. 
The aircraft operator must then contact one of two Secure Flight Resolution Centers 
(SFRC) to reach a resolution. A Secure Flight Analyst (SFA) then attempts to validate or 
invalidate the match based on a review of additional information.  
The SFA retrieves potential matches from a secure system and manually searches 
the systems checked by Secure Flight as well as other “intelligence resources.”58 These 
resources can provide additional details to the SFA who attempts to verify whether SFPD 
information is in fact a match to a watch list record.59 Specific procedures and criteria for 
this validation process are sensitive or classified and not available in public documents. 
Contracted Customer Service Agents (CSA) receive calls from aircraft operators, route 
them to an available SFA, and coordinate the resolution of traveler issues which may 
entail instructing the airline to print a boarding pass or coordinate notification of local 
law enforcement for further involvement if necessary.60 
Figure 2 represents the process flow for Secure Flight vetting, verification, and 
coordination procedures. 
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Office of 
Acquisition. “Official Solicitation for the TSA Secure Flight Resolution Center, call center support.” 
Solicitation No. HSTS02-08-R-TTC159. July 3, 2008. https://www.fbo.gov/
index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=ed9d723a863da7938300737ab3358e07. 
58 Ibid. 
59 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012).  http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Office of 
Acquisition. “Official Solicitation for the TSA Secure Flight Resolution Center, call center support.” 
Solicitation No. HSTS02-08-R-TTC159. July 3, 2008. https://www.fbo.gov/
index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=ed9d723a863da7938300737ab3358e07. 
 21 
                                                 
 
Figure 2.  Secure Flight Procedures (from TSA, 2009.)61 
There are weaknesses in this process. Federal Government and private industry 
partners have raised concerns that passengers can submit false data or present false 
identity documents to gain access to aircraft or “sterile areas of airports.62 To address this 
concern, TSA and Secure Flight are developing technology to use boarding pass scanners 
to help authenticate identity documents to ensure that all SFPD information matches the 
information on an individual’s identity document. This effort is called the Credential 
Authentication Technology – Boarding Pass Scanning Systems Initiative.63 
61 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. Secure Flight: 
Your Safety is Our Priority. As presented at the National Business Travel Association International 
Conference and Expo, San Diego, CA. August 26, 2009. http://www.gbta.org/Lists/Resource Library/
Secure Flight Presentation.ppt.  
62 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office. Privacy Impact Assessment Update For 
Credential Authentication Technology/Boarding Pass Scanning System. (DHS/TSA/PIA-024(b)) 
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False identities and false documents pose a problem for aviation security. As the 
GAO notes, “The Secure Flight Program relies on the accuracy of the information 
passengers submit during the reservation process.”64 This weakness to national security 
is further examined in the analysis section of this chapter. 
1. Development Status and System Performance 
The Secure Flight system has been developed and implemented incrementally. As 
DHS OIG noted in 2012: 
Secure Flight began program implementation with the first domestic 
aircraft operator on January 27, 2009. On June 22, 2010, Secure Flight met 
its goal of conducting watch list matching for all domestic aircraft 
operator flights within, into and out of the United States, as well as 
international point-to-point flights between two foreign cities. On 
November 23, 2010, Secure Flight completed deployment to all covered 
foreign air carriers flying into and out of the United States. Secure Flight 
expects all overflights (flights that fly over the United States, but do not 
land) will be covered by the end of calendar year 2012.65 
Though enhancements and expansions of Secure Flight continue, the program is 
in the “support life cycle phase,” according to the White House’s “Federal IT 
Dashboard,”66 which tracks and publishes information on large federal information 
technology investments. A typical information technology development life cycle 
includes design and development, acceptance testing, as well as training and transitioning 
as part of implementation. After deployment, the system is said to be in the “maintenance 
and operations” or “support” phase, as is the case with Secure Flight. This means that the 
system is fully operational with development or programming activities limited to 
maintenance and enhancements. TSA reports on the “IT Dashboard” that it has 
64 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version), (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
65 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 2012 – 2014. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, April 2013). http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/MGMT/DHS-%20Annual%20Performance%20Report%20and%20Congressional-Budget-
Justification-FY2014.pdf.  
66 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
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implemented enhancements to Secure Flight to support the Pre✔ program.67 The TSA 
also reports that the “program continues to operate within acceptable ranges for cost and 
schedule variances.”68 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) continues to assess the Secure Flight program as a Moderately Low Risk 
investment.”69 
Technological systems, especially those that rely on connections between 
networks, sometimes experience disruptions or outages. To reduce disruptions, Secure 
Flight has operational and system redundancy70 at Secure Flight centers in Annapolis 
Junction, Maryland and Colorado Springs, Colorado.71 Operational statistics from the 
White House IT Dashboard report that the service availability of Secure Flight to process 
SFPD from airlines at one or the other operation center was 100% as of May 2014.72  
The performance of the system as related to specific program goals will be 
evaluated in later sections.  
D. ANALYSIS 
In evaluating the appropriateness of the use of automation and DSS in the Secure 
Flight program, it is important to note that comprehensive, real-time passenger watch list 
matching would not be feasible without automation. Considering the volume of 
passengers checked—an estimated 2 million daily—this process could not exist without 
the use of pre-programmed matching queries of SFPD against the TDSB and other watch 
67 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version), OIG-12-94, (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Office of 
Acquisition. “Official Solicitation for the TSA Secure Flight Resolution Center, call center support.” 
Solicitation No. HSTS02-08-R-TTC159. July 3, 2008. https://www.fbo.gov/
index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=ed9d723a863da7938300737ab3358e07. 
72 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
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lists. The procedures for watch list matching by the airlines prior to the implementation 
of Secure Flight likely involved the use of decision support or querying tools; it is not 
likely that names were manually entered into a system to compare against the terror 
watch lists. Analyses of the benefits and costs of the Secure Flight program are of the 
improvements, if any, that the Secure Flight system offers over decentralized, non-
standardized matching by the airlines. It is well understood that prior to the 
implementation of Secure Flight, matching was completed using different methods and 
techniques by different airlines.73 This establishes a baseline of performance for service, 
operational efficiencies, and national security to make a comparison for this analysis.  
Unlike the airlines’ automated procedures for querying passenger information 
before the implementation of Secure Flight, the current procedures for querying databases 
in immigration adjudication are almost entirely manual. Despite this difference, this 
analysis informs the evaluation of implementing automation or DSS for immigration 
adjudications. An analysis of the streamlining of matching procedures into a centralized 
system, of the benefits and costs to stakeholders, and of procedures for verifying matches 
manually and coordinating procedures with law enforcement or other partners can inform 
the decision to utilize automation and DSS for immigration adjudications. 
1. Benefits and Costs to Stakeholders 
This case study will attempt to identify and categorize expected and realized 
benefits and costs to the Secure Flight stakeholders. Secure Flight’s primary stakeholder 
and customer is the traveling public. Another important group of stakeholders are 
commercial aircraft carriers in the aviation industry.  
The use of DSS to vet passenger names against watch lists to automatically clear 
them, flag them, or refer those with adverse information for manual reviews offers 
several benefits to stakeholders. These include passenger-related customer service 
improvements and benefits that support airline industry business models. Automation/
73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management. Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf . 
 25 
                                                 
DSS also offers national security benefits through risk reduction and direct operational 
efficiencies to the Agency. Many of the benefits of the Secure Flight program’s 
automated watch list matching and its supporting procedures are interrelated and 
intertwined across stakeholders and categories. 
a. Benefits to the Traveling Public 
Benefits to the traveling public derived from the implementation of automated 
watch list matching include faster and more efficient processing, protection of passenger 
privacy, and an improved redress process for misidentified passengers. The enhancement 
of the security of commercial air travel is a direct benefit to passengers and will be 
discussed in detail in a later section. 
Faster and More Efficient Processing 
By implementing one watch list matching system, the Secure Flight program 
claims to “provide a fair and consistent matching process across all airlines and reduces 
the chance of being misidentified.”74 In evaluating the Secure Flight procedures and 
decision support tool, there is validity to this claim.  
By bringing watch list matching under a single centralized system, Secure Flight 
indeed implements consistency across all aircraft operators75 where previously there was 
variability. Whatever value the traveling public places on consistency, fairness, and 
equitability, Secure Flight offers an improvement.  
Secure Flight also claims that its matching system is “more effective” and 
passengers benefit from fewer travelers misidentified.76 The Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit, available online, states: “Providing the required data elements 
enables Secure Flight to more effectively perform watch list matching. More than 99 
74 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
75 Ibid. 
76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
D.C.: n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
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percent of passengers will be cleared to print their boarding passes at home when 
complete information is provided.”77 Though the statistic cannot be evaluated without 
testing the system, this claim also has validity. Although Secure Flight requires that 
passengers provide more data –technically a “cost” to them—the collection of additional 
data elements enables more reliable matching results. Fewer false positives mean fewer 
passengers are misidentified. This reduces the probability of a passenger being selected 
for expedited screening and is an improvement over prior matching systems and 
procedures. 
Fewer false negatives mean that matches to the watch lists are more consistently 
identified. The robustness of the queries and the use of additional data elements improves 
matching, thus supporting Secure Flight’s claim of improvements to security for the 
traveling public.78 More analysis of improvements to national security is offered in a 
later section. 
 TSA also claims that Secure Flight offers a “better travel experience for 
passengers”79 because it performs watch list matching prior to the passengers arriving at 
the airport. There is validity to this claim due to the accompanying validation procedures. 
Because Secure Flight requires the submission of available data 72 hours before 
scheduled departure,80 SFA have the opportunity to investigate the potential matches and 
clear false positives, if possible. This would certainly reduce or eliminate the 
inconvenience for a passenger who was initially matched to a list, but cleared in advance 
77 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
78 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC.: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
79 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
80 Delta Airlines. “Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) FAQs.” October 8, 2010. 
http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/agency/useful-resources/secure-flight-passenger-data-
faqs.html. (Accessed May 22, 2014). 
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of a flight. In addition, uniform watch list matching conducted prior to boarding reduces 
or eliminates the potential for flight diversions or deplaning due to watch list concerns.81  
Figure 3 depicts TSA’s vision for the Secure Flight program. 
 
Figure 3.  Secure Flight Passenger Procedures (from GAO, 2005)82 
Protecting Passenger Privacy 
Prior to the implementation of Secure Flight, aircraft operators performed 
passenger name matching against copies of terrorist watch lists. Details on each airline’s 
procedures for watch list matching are not available, but these procedures likely did not 
involve transmission of data—which carries information security and privacy risks. That 
being said, the lack of centralization or regulation in watch list matching means that 
individual airline procedures were certainly different, and thus the handling of passenger 
information was inconsistent. 
 “Protecting the privacy of individuals’ information is a cornerstone of Secure 
Flight,”83 states the TSA website providing Secure Flight program information. The 
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
82 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. (GAO-05-256) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005). 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-256.   
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Privacy Act of 1974 “prohibits the disclosure of a record about an individual”84 from any 
government system of records without his/her written consent, “unless the disclosure is 
pursuant to one of twelve statutory exceptions.”85 Privacy Act regulations required that 
the Secure Flight program file a System of Records Notice (SORN)86 as well as regular 
updates to a Privacy Impact Analysis (PIA).87 TSA simultaneously filed a rulemaking to 
exempt Secure Flight from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. Those provisions 
related to protecting counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and 
analysis activities.88 As a result, Secure Flight’s “cornerstone” of privacy—that 
passenger information is protected and not released to the general public—must be 
interpreted to include the use of that information for other purposes, such as 
counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence. 
TSA states that all “personal data is collected, used, distributed, stored and 
disposed of in accordance with stringent guidelines and all applicable privacy laws and 
regulations.”89 Adherence to Privacy Act regulations is intended to protect passengers’ 
personal information from unauthorized use and disclosure.90 GAO has documented that 
privacy experts were involved in system development. GAO also notes that TSA has 
implemented training for Secure Flight staff in privacy policies and procedures and has 
privacy performance metrics and analyses. TSA is credited with implementing controls 
83 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014.,http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. (Accessed May 26, 
2014). 
84 Privacy Act, U.S. Code 5 (1974), § 522a. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2012-title5/pdf/
USCODE-2012-title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552a.pdf.  
85 Ibid. 
86 The Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to publish a notice describing a record system from 
which information is retrieved by name or other personal identifier (such as Social Security Number) 
whenever such a system is created or substantially revised.  
87 The E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct privacy impact assessment before 
developing systems that collect, maintain or disseminate information in an identifiable form. 
88 “Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions and System of Records; Secure Flight 
Records; Final Rule and Notice.” Federal Register 7, no. 217 (Friday, November 9, 2007), 63706. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-11-09/pdf/E7-21907.pdf. 
89 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
90 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
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for data quality, security, and access as well as other efforts to track and audit access to 
personally identifiable information (PII) in order to ensure passenger privacy.91  
TSA asserts that it “collects the minimum amount of personal information 
necessary to conduct effective watch list matching.”92 However, for most airlines, the 
standard SFPD included more personal information than had previously been collected93 
and could be considered a negative impact on passenger privacy. Operational testing 
prior to the implementation of Secure Flight determined that it was necessary to 
standardize SFPD to include gender and birthdate for all passengers to minimize false 
positives and the subsequent inconvenience for legitimate passengers and to reduce the 
expenditure of resources to invalidate inappropriate matches.  
As stated on an airline’s website, customers must provide SPFD to be issued a 
boarding pass: “As a customer, you consent to the use of your Secure Flight information 
for these purposes.”94 On August 23, 2007, TSA issued a “Notice of Public Rule 
Making” (NPRM) to establish the Secure Flight Program95 and another to exempt Secure 
Flight from certain provisions of the Privacy Act,96 each with a 60-day open public 
comment period through October 22, 2007. On the same day, TSA also published a 
91 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO- 
09–292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292. 
92 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight: 
Frequently Asked Questions.” March 19, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/content/frequently-asked-questions-
secure-flight.  
93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
94 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx.. (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
95 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Program.” Federal Register 72, no. 163 (August 23, 2007): 48356. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2007-08-23/pdf/E7-15960.pdf. 
96 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Privacy Act of 
1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Secure Flight Records.” Federal Register 72, no. 163 (August 23, 
2007): 48357, August 23, 2007. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-08-23/pdf/E7-15963.pdf. 
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“Privacy Impact Assessment” per Privacy Act requirements.97 TSA received influential 
comments from two privacy advocacy groups related to the collection and storage of 
SFPD and to a concern about the efficacy of redress processes.98 In its response, TSA 
continued to claim a need for certain exemptions for national security and law 
enforcement purposes.99 Secure Flight thus acknowledges that it is exercising a privacy 
tradeoff for improved matching efficiency. This tradeoff may be mitigated by the 
additional privacy protocols that TSA can enforce, but this mitigation may not satisfy 
privacy advocacy organizations.  
Public communications such as an ad from TSA shown in Figure 4 are intended to 
inform passengers of the benefits of providing SFPD for Secure Flight Matching. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Secure Flight Ad (from GBTA, 2009)100 
97 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment.” 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, April 9, 2007). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_pia_tsa_secureflight.pdf. 
98 “Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions and System of Records; Secure Flight 
Records; Final Rule and Notice.” Federal Register 7, no. 217 (Friday, November 9, 2007), 63706. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-11-09/pdf/E7-21907.pdf.  
99 Ibid. 
100 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight: 
Your Safety is our Priority.” Presentation to Global Business Travel Association (GBTA) Conference, 
April 22, 2009. http://www.gbta.org/Lists/Resource%20Library/NBTAWebinar_SecureFlight.pdf . 
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Assertions that Secure Flight offers improvements to protecting the privacy of 
airline passengers over the previous system in which aircraft operators conducted watch 
list matching requires that independent reviewers confirm that TSA’s privacy controls are 
effective. In 2006, the DHS Privacy Office reported some “largely unintentional, yet 
significant privacy missteps”101 by the Secure Flight program in its operational testing 
and development phases. As a result, Secure Flight made significant changes in program 
requirements to address these privacy and security concerns.102 In 2009, GAO 
documented privacy and security weaknesses in the Secure Flight program; however later 
that same year, it noted that TSA had “completed the actions to implement”103 
recommendations related to privacy and security, and it considered those conditions to be 
“generally achieved.”104 On May 21, 2014, the White House’s “Federal IT Dashboard” 
analyzed Secure Flight to be in 100% compliance with privacy and records retention 
schedules as established by the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA).105 
Improved redress process for passengers who have been misidentified 
“Redress” refers to passenger-initiated corrections to watch list match results. 
Though the Secure Flight system intends to be an improvement in efficiency of watch list 
matching, “false positives” may still occur if a passenger has the same or similar name to 
someone on the watch list.106 When a passenger’s SFPD has produced a watch list match 
incorrectly, that individual may participate in the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
101 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office. “Report to the Public on the 
Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program and Privacy Recommendations.” 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2006). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy-secure-flight-122006.pdf. 
102 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. (GAO-10-
588SP) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/204132.pdf. 
103 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO- 
09–292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292.  
104 Ibid. 
105 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172.  (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
106 NBS News.com, “How Secure Flight Works.” http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39892975/ns/travel-
travel_tips/t/how-secure-flight-works/. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
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(DHS TRIP). It serves as a “single portal for travelers to seek redress for adverse 
screening experiences and to resolve possible watch list misidentification issues.”107 
Prior to the implementation of Secure Flight, individuals seeking redress had limited 
success in airlines recognizing their redress credential due to the diversity of matching 
systems.108 
Secure Flight states that it uniformly applies the DHS TRIP list in its watch list 
matching process to prevent the misidentification of passengers who have been 
cleared.109 Operational performance statistics from the White House IT Dashboard 
reported that 99.96 percent of passengers who have submitted a valid redress number 
have been automatically recognized and cleared by the Secure Flight system. The target 
for 2014 was 95 percent.110 Although this implies that the system is working well and is 
an improvement for many passengers, nevertheless it still means that many are not 
recognized and continue to face enhanced screening or other difficulties when they 
attempt to fly. The DHS TRIP program including application procedures and processing 
time have come under review by the DHS OIG.111 Improvements to this program would 
directly improve Secure Flight. 
b. Costs to the Traveling Public 
Compliance with data collection requirements 
TSA claims “it is to the passenger’s advantage to provide the required data 
elements” to prevent delays or inconveniences at the airport, “particularly for those 
107 Ibid. 
108 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight: 
Your Safety is our Priority.” Presentation to NBTA Conference, April 22, 2009. http://www.gbta.org/Lists/
Resource%20Library/NBTAWebinar_SecureFlight.pdf . 
109 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
110 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=17. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
111 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Effectiveness of the 
Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (redacted version). (OIG-09-103) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 2009). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIG-09-103r_Sep09.pdf . 
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individuals who have been misidentified in the past.”112 This claim is likely valid for 
individuals who were incorrectly matched to a watch list prior to Secure Flight but were 
properly cleared since its implementation. However, for most passengers who never 
matched to a list, providing additional information about themselves to comply with 
SFPD requirements could be considered an opportunity cost with no direct benefit.  
That being said, the amount of time to provide this data could conceivably be 
discounted as negligible. For a technology savvy individual who has made flight 
reservations on an airline’s website, completing a few additional fields might amount to a 
few seconds. In the Regulatory and Economic Analysis prepared by TSA’s 
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) group, the amount of additional 
time to provide this information was estimated between 10 and 25 seconds depending on 
the mode of reservation.113 Aggregated over the millions of flights to, from, or within the 
United States, however, this time represents a significant cost. The TSNM analysis 
estimates this cost would amount to $645.6 million over the first 10 years of the program, 
based on hourly rate guidance from TSA and estimates on the number of flights subject 
to the Secure Flight rule.114 
Personal privacy concessions  
As previously discussed in the traveler benefits section, opinions on Secure 
Flight’s impact on passenger privacy are mixed. Privacy advocacy organization 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)115 submitted comments in September 2007, shortly 
after the NPRM request to exempt Secure Flight from certain provisions of the Privacy 
Act. EFF generally challenged TSA’s bases for claiming Privacy Act exemptions, stating 
112 NBS News.com, “How Secure Flight Works.” http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39892975/ns/travel-
travel_tips/t/how-secure-flight-works/. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
113 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.” September 24, 
2007. https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/travelscreening/092407_secure_flight_comments.pdf. (Accessed 
July 25, 2014).  
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that the Secure Flight program “lacked adequate transparency” and failed to assure the 
public that their information would only be collected for “relevant and necessary use.”116 
EFF further claimed that Secure Flight provides individuals neither a “meaningful redress 
process” nor “meaningful access to personal information.”117 The DHS TRIP program 
had only recently been established at the time of the NPRM, and its development 
maturation may satisfy EFF’s concerns about redress. Though TSA countered these 
comments in their response,118 they remain valid. 
c. Benefits to the Aviation Industry 
Relief from watch list matching responsibilities 
The most tangible benefit to the air carriers is that, with the full implementation of 
the Secure Flight program, they are relieved of the responsibility for watch list 
matching.119 Elimination of watch list matching responsibilities enables airlines to 
reallocate some operational resources to core business or other tasks and offset some of 
the costs incurred to comply with Secure Flight regulations.120 These costs will be 
discussed further.  
Match resolution 
The majority of aircraft operators interviewed by the OIG noted a “decrease in the 
average resolution call time since Secure Flight’s implementation. The average call 
response time for FY 2011 was 7 seconds with most resolution calls lasting 2 to 8 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 “Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions and System of Records; Secure Flight 
Records; Final Rule and Notice.” Federal Register 7, no. 217 (Friday, November 9, 2007), 63706. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-11-09/pdf/E7-21907.pdf . 
119 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management. Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 




                                                 
minutes;” however, a TSA customer service representative will “stay on the call as long 
as necessary to resolve any issues.”121  
d. Costs to the Airline Industry 
As previously discussed, aircraft operators and travel agencies must submit SFPD 
electronically to Secure Flight. Most transmit passenger data directly through a DHS 
portal, and others submit data through the web application “eSecure Flight.” Aircraft 
carriers had both initial and recurring costs to support this requirement. These costs 
generally take two forms: reprogramming costs and program implementation costs.122 
Reprogramming includes such tasks as reprogramming the airline website to 
enable passengers to enter each component of their full name in a separate field; adding 
fields for date of birth, gender, and Redress Number, as necessary; and adding the 
privacy notice to websites. Additional reprogramming requirements include modifying 
ticketing consoles and kiosks to accept and properly process the gate and boarding pass 
printing instructions returned by Secure Flight.  
The airlines had to change their systems and procedures to collect and submit 
SFPD. TSA determined the SFPD data elements required during the testing that was 
conducted prior to implementing Secure Flight. Airlines had been collecting information 
from passengers at the time of their reservations, but there was no consistency in the 
formats or elements collected across the airlines. Most were collecting less than what was 
determined to comprise SFPD.123 Thus, upgrading reservation systems to capture all the 
121 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
122 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
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SFPD elements, rebuilding collection tools, and retraining staff on the updated software 
and reservation procedures are all among the costs to the airlines and travel agencies.124  
In an economic analysis, TSA’s Transportation Network Management Office 
attempted to estimate the dollar costs associated with reprogramming and implementing 
systems to support Secure Flight. TSA encountered a wide variance in costs reported by 
airlines; however, they provide $1.5 million as an average per airline.125 Full life-cycle 
costs are not presented in this analysis; however, recurring costs to support the Secure 
Flight program are expected. External sources have attempted to estimate the full cost of 
reprogramming airline and travel agency systems to be compliant with Secure Flight. The 
International Air Transport Association estimates that it will take $2 billion126 to comply, 
and travel writer Edward Hasbrouck has estimated the industry will bear a $1 billion 
burden.127  
Additionally, the airlines have borne much of the burden associated with customer 
awareness campaigns. The traveling public likely became aware of the new requirements 
for SFPD the first time they made an airline reservation after the implementation of 
Secure Flight. Airlines had to provide additional information and undoubtedly had to 
field customer service inquiries from passengers when the changes went into effect. 
Indeed, all major U.S. carriers, such as United Airlines,128 American Airlines,129 and 
124 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
125 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
126 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). “The Four Biggest Problems With the ‘Secure Flight’ 
Airline Security Program.” March 4, 2005. https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/four-biggest-
problems-secure-flight-airline-security-program. (Accessed May 25, 2014). 
127 Edward Hasbrouck. “Why CAPPS-II Would Cost a Billion Dollars.” The Practical Nomad, 
February 13, 2004. http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/000149.html . 
128 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx.  (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
129 American Airlines. “TSA Secure Flight Information Is Required To Travel.” n.d. 
http://www.aa.com/i18n/utility/secureFlight.jsp?anchorLocation=DirectURL&title=secureflight. (Accessed 
May 25, 2014). 
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Delta,130 have specific information posted on their websites related to Secure Flight. 
Most of these websites reflect content that TSA produced in a “toolkit” specifically for 
airlines to communicate to their customers.131 This may have decreased the 
communication burden on airlines; however, the airlines remain the “front line” of 
customer service related to Secure Flight.  
TSA reported to the White House IT Dashboard that 100 percent of the aircraft 
operators that were covered under the Secure Flight Final Rule had “on-boarded” with 
the program, and that 98.54 percent of all SFPD submissions were compliant.132 This 
indicates that most airlines have already incurred the costs of implementing the system 
and are now in the “recurring costs” phase of supporting the program. While the airline 
industry has struggled in recent years, compliance with Secure Flight has not been cited 
as a reason for airline challenges. 
2. Benefits and Costs to Agency Operations 
a. Benefits to Operations 
Resource alignment 
Reliability and efficiency in automation refer to a model performing within a 
specified margin of error—that is, does it minimize false positives and false negatives. 
While neither the error statistics nor the matching criteria for Secure Flight are available 
in public documents, significant testing went into the development of the model and the 
required data elements. The OIG and GAO reports indicate that Secure Flight continues 
refining the matching criteria to ensure that the system appropriately identifies those who 
match a watch list and clear those who do not. In addition to continuously refined 
queries, the incorporation of data from the DHS TRIP and “Trusted Traveler” programs, 
130 Delta Airlines. “Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) FAQs.” October 8, 2010. 
http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/agency/useful-resources/secure-flight-passenger-data-
faqs.html. (Accessed May 25, 2014). 
131 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
132 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
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such as Global Entry, SENTRI and NEXUS,133 improve the reliability and robustness of 
the matching results. This allows for a more optimal allocation of resources. For example, 
positive matches require review by an SFA and potentially enhanced security screening. 
Fewer false positives and negatives reduce the instances that require labor-intensive 
review. This results in improved overall operational efficiency.134 This efficiency 
benefits TSA and partners who may be involved in labor-intensive processes, such as law 
enforcement or the airlines.  
Alerts and referral procedures 
The Secure Flight Program automation tool and procedures may provide earlier 
insight into potential matches, improving the coordination of response activities. For all 
advance reservations, Secure Flight requires that passenger data be sent for matching 
purposes 72 hours before a departure.135 Secure Flight’s automated, rapid results and 
preliminary notification reports on potential matches allows for manual verification by an 
SFA before a scheduled flight. This also expedites law enforcement notification136 and 
allows federal entities to coordinate coverage at airports and on aircraft, as necessary.137 
Prior to the implementation of Secure Flight, the coordination of law enforcement or 
other necessary response to a potential match was not consistent across the aviation 
industry.138 SF also provides an interactive capability for recurring or manual watch list 
matching on a 24/7 basis through the SF Operations Center. “139 
133 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx.  (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
134 NBS News.com, “How Secure Flight Works,” http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39892975/ns/travel-
travel_tips/t/how-secure-flight-works/. (Accessed June 1, 2014). 
135 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
136 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight: 
Your Safety is our Priority.” Presentation to NBTA Conference, April 22, 2009. http://www.gbta.org/Lists/
Resource%20Library/NBTAWebinar_SecureFlight.pdf . 
137 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Implementation and 
Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (redacted version), (OIG-12-94) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, July 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGr_12-
94_Jul12.pdf. 
138 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
139 Ibid. 
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 Secure Flight also enables risk-based initiatives such as expedited airport 
screening procedures for passengers who are identified as “low-risk.” Discussed later as 
it relates to national security benefits, utilizing the information from Secure Flight on a 
passenger’s relative security risk could improve airport screening operations by enabling 
TSA to focus its resources on higher-risk passengers.140 
b. Costs to Operations 
Costs of Development, Maintenance, and Operations 
 It is important to note that federal operation of watch list matching and 
development of the Secure Flight program were mandated by Congress through IRTPA 
2004.141 An analysis of alternatives that is generally required for large-scale federal 
acquisitions was not conducted. However, the costs to develop and maintain the system 
have been systematically reviewed and scrutinized by several organizations, including 
GAO, both DHS and Department of Justice OIG, and the White House information 
technology review panel called the IT Dashboard. 
Compiling the numbers published by any of these organizations is difficult and 
would not likely yield an accurate aggregation or total estimated cost for implementing 
and operating Secure Flight. During the five-year period in which TSA began building 
and testing Secure Flight, it received appropriations of approximately $300 million.142  
Maintenance, operations, and enhancement costs for Secure Flight remain high. 
Figure 5, a chart produced by GAO, demonstrates the continuing costs to support the 
Secure Flight effort as reported by DHS: 
 
140 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Transportation 
Sector Network Management. Regulatory and Economic Analysis. Regulatory Evaluation: Secure Flight 
Final Rule (49 CFR 1560). October 17, 2008. http://www.papersplease.org/_dl/sf/
Secure_Flight_regulatory_assessment.pdf. 
141 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o 
et. seq. 
142 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO- 
09–292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292. 
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Figure 5.  GAO Analysis of Secure Flight Continuing Costs (from GAO, 2014)143 
These costs appear to rise over time; however, it is difficult to differentiate 
maintenance costs from enhancement costs. The success of the Secure Flight program has 
resulted in its continued development and the expansion of its capabilities from its initial 
deployment. For example, TSA’s fiscal year 2012 budget request proposed funding to 
deploy a pilot project related to screening against the additional TSDB records.144 This 
included an increase of $8.9 million and 38 full-time personnel that TSA stated it would 
use for “information technology enhancements that will be required to implement this 
expanded screening and will allow TSA to handle the increased workload.”145 
143 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better 
Manage Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress. (GAO-14-
332) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-332.  
144 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of 
Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts. (GAO-
12-476) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012). http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf . 
145 Ibid.  
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Another budget request included $12.7 million for fully deploying the Secure 
Flight system over all passengers as mandated by IRTPA which TSA stated would add “a 
significant layer to TSA’s aviation security operations.”146 TSA requested an additional 
$30 million for a Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) program that was 
intended to “achieve significant economies of scale and other benefits associated with a 
unifying business integration effort.”147 TSA’s overall budget request to support Secure 
Flight grew from $92,414,000 and 239 government full-time equivalent (FTE) employees 
in fiscal year 2012148 to $106,198,000 and 286 FTE in fiscal year 2014.149 
To support the Secure Flight Program, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center 
(TSC) made systems and procedures changes. According to the Department of Justice 
Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), the direct and indirect costs associated with 
this effort in 2005 and 2006 exceeded $58 million.150 Operations expenses continue for 
the TSC, as well. 
As previously mentioned, these costs are appropriated by the Congress to support 
this federally mandated program. If the demonstrated value of the Secure Flight program 
was not apparent to the Congress, it would have the opportunity to decline budget 
requests. 
The GAO and DHS OIG have both identified cost and schedule risks associated 
with the management of the Secure Flight program in several reports ranging from 2008 
146 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Budget-in-Brief, Fiscal Year 2014. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, February 2013). http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%284%29.pdf. 
147 Ibid. 
148 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2012–2014. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013). http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/MGMT/DHS-%20Annual%20Performance%20Report%20and%20Congressional-Budget-
Justification-FY2014.pdf.  
149 Ibid.  
150 U.S. Department of Justice, Inspector General. Review of the Terrorist Screening Center’s Efforts 
to Support the Secure Flight Program (redacted version). (OIG-05-34) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005). http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0534/final.pdf. 
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to the present.151 Efficient and effective management of resources would limit the 
unnecessary cost associated with maintaining and enhancing the Secure Flight system. 
3. Effects of Automation on National Security 
a. Benefits to National Security 
The matching of airline passenger information against terrorist watch-list 
records (watch-list matching) is a frontline defense against acts of 
terrorism that target the nation’s civil aviation system.152 
 
Centralized automated operations: consistency, uniformity, and flexibility 
As discussed, before the implementation of Secure Flight, airlines were 
responsible for performing watch list matching of passengers with a variety of systems 
and procedures.153 By assigning the watch list screening process to the federal 
government, procedures are consistent across all airlines, and comparisons can be made 
using a single system.154 This benefits national security.  
First, it allows SFA to develop expertise with results to better identify potential 
issues. The analysis of results to confirm a match is one of the most important steps in the 
process from a national security perspective. The automated matching tool is a “decision 
support” system in that it is intended to clear from the queue most individuals who are 
very unlikely to pose a threat based on the query logic. Certainly, the appropriateness of 
the logic and the quality of the data are also significant factors in national security, both 
to be addressed later in this section. By uniformly applying the logic across all airlines, 
151 See U.S. Government Accountability Office reports GAO-06-864T, GAO-09-29, GAO-14-332. 
Available at http://www.gao.gov/index.html . See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
the Inspector General, report OIG-12-94, available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov. 
152 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks. (GAO- 
09–292) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292.  
153 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
154 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for 
the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. (GAO-06-864T) (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-864T. 
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the SFA is given the opportunity to develop expertise in the matching process to better 
identify potential issues.  
Additionally, the system can be “effectively and swiftly calibrated”155 with 
changes applied universally across all passengers and airlines. This can be done either 
temporarily in response to an elevated threat environment, or permanently, based on new 
information or analysis to improve matching logic. This applies to both procedures and 
technologies. Flexibility and rapid responsiveness in watch list matching have a positive 
effect on national security. Both are improved by centralized, automated systems and 
operations. 
Use of real-time and expanded watch lists 
National security is improved by centralizing the watch list matching procedures 
in the federal government by improving the quality of the input data. That is, the federal 
government can connect directly to the TDSB and utilize real-time watch list 
information,156 whereas previously, aircraft operators might have been using a list that 
was out of date. Further, if needed, the federal government can authorize the inclusion of 
additional or expanded lists in real time to vet potential matches or apply to all 
passengers when warranted by security considerations,157 for example, if TSA learns that 
flights on a particular route may be subject to increased security risk.158 The use of a 
centralized watch list matching decision support system enables improvements to 
national security that were unavailable under the previous system. 
The quality of watch list data remains a criticism of the watch list matching 
process. The GAO has identified several issues related to watch list management in its 
155 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf.  
156 Ibid. 
157 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for 
the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. (GAO-06-864T) (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-864T.  
158 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Terror Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency 
Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts. (GAO-12-476) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2012). http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf.  
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oversight of the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC), especially after the failure to 
accurately identify and prevent Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—often referred to as “the 
underwear bomber”—from boarding Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to 
Detroit, where he attempted to detonate a concealed explosive device on December 25, 
2009.159 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) criticized the lists in 2005, citing 
“disastrous”160 experiences that Americans have had being misidentified. Though 
presumably the DHS TRIP program corrects many of the issues cited by the ACLU, poor 
data quality would certainly affect the quality of watch list matches. The quality of the 
nomination process and the information stored in the TDSB is managed and reviewed by 
separate processes and is not affected—at least initially—by the use of Secure Flight. 
At first implementation, this risk to national security related to watch list data 
quality at a minimum does not increase with the use of Secure Flight DSS and 
automation. It is reasonable to suspect that feedback loops between TSA and TSC could 
enable improvements to data quality in the TDSB. The sharing of PII across agencies 
requires adherence to privacy regulations to ensure that it is handled properly and utilized 
only for national security or law enforcement purposes.161 Information collected by TSA 
through redress checks or manual vetting by an SFA, if fed back to the TDSB, could 
improve national security efforts beyond aviation security. 
Expediting law enforcement response 
Perhaps one of the most important benefits of the Secure Flight system and 
procedures is the improved ability to coordinate an appropriate law enforcement response 
to potential threats.162 The Secure Flight system provides earlier insight to potential 
159 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for 
the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. (GAO-12-476) (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2012). http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf. 
160 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). “The Four Biggest Problems With the ‘Secure Flight’ 
Airline Security Program.” March 4, 2005. https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/four-biggest-
problems-secure-flight-airline-security-program. (Accessed May 25, 2014). 
161 Under 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2), an agency may exempt from certain provisions of 
the Privacy Act a system of records containing investigatory material. 
162 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
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matches due to efficient, automated matching.163 After an automated match is made, the 
supporting procedures enable officials to address security threats sooner, improving the 
safety of air travel.164 The timeliness and accuracy of matching and the ability to 
coordinate law enforcement responses were not consistent across the aviation industry165 
prior to the implementation of Secure Flight.  
Improved and standardized technology 
TSA leveraged existing systems and used “industry-standard commercial-off-the-
shelf” (COTS) software in developing the Secure Flight DSS.166 Former TSA Deputy 
Administrator Gail Rossides said the end product was an “efficient, cost-effective, and 
responsive system,” and credited the data submission process with being “flexible.”167 
While this is not an evaluation of the appropriateness of the systems selected or the 
quality of the developed Secure Flight product, it is important to note technological 
improvements over the previous system of aircraft operators conducting their own 
matches. TSA suggests that the system fully “raises the baseline standard in terms of the 
technology and automation,”168 and arguably it does. By integrating all watch list 
matching under Secure Flight system, at a very minimum, baselines and standards in 
information security and the use of automation technology are established.169 
Centralizing watch list matching also permits technological improvements to be applied 
163 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit.  
164 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx.  (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
165 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
166 The Secure Flight program’s two operations centers run identical configurations of hardware and 
commercial off-the-shelf software. Key components include IBM’s DB2 relational database, the IBM 
Tivoli product suite, IBM Websphere MQ series messaging backbone, and IBM Rational ClearCase 
software management running on UNIX/AIX and Windows operating systems. 
167 Patrick Marshall. “Secure Flight’s off-the-shelf recipe.” GCN. http://gcn.com/articles/2011/10/17/
tsa-secure-flight-tech-sidebar.aspx. (Accessed May 11, 2014). 
168 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Communications Toolkit: Talking Points for Editorial from TSA.” July 20, 2010, Version 3.0. 
http://www.tsa.gov/content/communications-toolkit.  
169 Patrick Marshall. “Secure Flight’s off-the-shelf recipe.” GCN. http://gcn.com/articles/2011/10/17/
tsa-secure-flight-tech-sidebar.aspx. (Accessed May 11, 2014). 
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systemically. One might argue that private industry could deploy system upgrades more 
nimbly than the federal government. However, compelling airlines to continuously 
upgrade their systems would likely require regulations and incentives. The TSA has the 
organizational mission to “provide the most effective transportation security in the most 
efficient way”170 and can be expected to fund, develop, and deploy improvements to 
Secure Flight technology. 
Watch list distribution 
When matching was conducted by individual airlines, static versions of the terror 
watch lists were being distributed.171 There were limited controls on what happened to 
those lists after they left the possession of the U.S. Government.172 Though this is not a 
benefit of automation specifically, the program itself results in a benefit to national 
security by limiting the distribution of sensitive watch list data, decreasing the risk of the 
lists being compromised.173 Furthermore, information security risks are more difficult to 
manage in distributed systems than in closed systems.174 Keeping PII and national 
security information within a closed system with access controls enhances both security 
and privacy. Access controls on closed systems also provide mechanisms for deterring 
internal abuse, often referred to as “insider threats.” 
Ability to utilize risk-based security procedures 
In addition to more effectively identifying individuals on the No Fly and Selectee 
Lists and coordinating appropriate responses to matches, the implementation of Secure 
170 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Mission, Vision, 
and Core Values.” January, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/mission-vision-and-core-values. (Accessed 
May 26, 2014). 
171 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Advance Passenger Information System Pre-Departure 
Final Rule & Secure Flight Notice of Rule Making. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.). http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/apis-secure-flight-joint-faqs.pdf. 
172 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight: 
Your safety is our priority.” Presentation to GBTA Conference, April 22, 2009. http://www.gbta.org/Lists/
Resource%20Library/NBTAWebinar_SecureFlight.pdf . 
173 United Airlines. “Secure Flight.” http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/airport/id/
secure.aspx. (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
174 Tom Welsh. “The Security Risks of Modern Distributed Systems.” CSO Online. November 9, 
2005. http://www.csoonline.com/article/2119090/data-protection/the-security-risks-of-modern-distributed-
systems.html. (Accessed July 11, 2014). 
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Flight supports risk-based security procedures. TSA’s Risk-Based Security (RBS) 
mission is to “focus its resources and improve the passenger experience at security 
checkpoints.”175 TSA is now using its Secure Flight system to identify travelers who may 
be eligible for expedited screening by using information already collected and provided 
to TSA by the airlines.176 Moving passengers who are identified as “low-risk” to an 
expedited screening queue allows TSA to focus its screening efforts on passengers who 
are more likely to pose a threat.177 Incorporating this type of risk-based assessment in 
security procedures may preserve or improve national security in the face of a growing 
traveling population178 and relatively stagnant resources and budgets. 
Statistics on resource reduction from this effort are not available. A 2011 analysis 
published by the National Security Research Division at RAND showed that 
simultaneous resource and risk-reduction are possible with the incorporation of risk-
based security screenings such as using passenger data or trusted traveler programs to 
expedite the screening of certain passengers.179 However, random selection for expedited 
screening at airports is raising public concern over privacy.180 Though passengers benefit 
from the expedited screening procedures, they do not know why or how they were 
selected. Publishing these criteria might make it easier for terrorists or other criminals to 
exploit the system. Public education that does not compromise the process could mitigate 
privacy concerns.  
175 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight.” 
https://itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=172. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
176 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Risk-Based 
Security Initiatives.” February 10, 2014. http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/tsa-risk-assessments. 
(Accessed May 26, 2014). 
177 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment Update for 
Secure Flight DHS/TSA/PIA - 018(e).” April 13, 2012. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy_pia_tsa_secureflight_update018%28e%29.pdf.  
178 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Secure Flight 
Overview.” March 19, 2014, http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program. 
179 Brian A. Jackson, Edward W. Chan, and Tom LaTourrette. “Assessing the Security Benefits of a 
Trusted Traveler Program in the Presence of Attempted Attacker Exploitation and Compromise.” (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corp., May 2011). http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/
RAND_WR855.pdf. (Accessed July 11, 2014). 
180 Amar Toor. “PreCheck unchecked: why the TSA is putting more people in the fast lane.” The 
Verge. January 14, 2014. http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/14/5307000/why-is-the-tsa-pushing-everyone-
through-precheck-security-screening. (Accessed July 11, 2014). 
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b. Risks to National Security 
False identities and documents 
Often cited as a weakness of passenger watch list matching are challenges with 
identify verification and false document use. Secure Flight would likely identify a 
terrorist who willingly offered an airline his/her real name, true age and gender, and valid 
passport or other identification documents. However, someone attempting to defeat 
Secure Flight or any other matching system might make the effort to use a false identity 
and false documents. TSA investigated the possibility of using commercially available 
data to verify information that was being processed by Secure Flight, potentially 
mitigating some of this risk. TSA had intended to use information such as driving records 
and credit history to verify the accuracy of information provided by travelers.181 
Criticism of the privacy impacts of the use of commercial data prompted TSA to 
discontinue testing and abandon the inclusion of commercial data in Secure Flight.182 
Though Secure Flight does not offer an improvement validating the identity and 
documents provided by a passenger, the use of Secure Flight’s automation tools for watch 
list matching is no worse than the previous systems. 
4. Findings 
The fundamental factors for evaluating the policy decision to implement 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures as outlined in the methodology 
for this analysis are: 
• expected benefits to stakeholders,  
• potential improvements in operational efficiency, and 
• potential reduction of risks to national security. 
181 Ronald London. “Secure Flight Will Not Use Commercial Databases.” Privacy Security Law Blog. 
http://www.privsecblog.com/2005/09/articles/policy-regulatory-positioning/secure-flight-will-not-use-
commercial-databases/. (Accessed July 19, 2014). 
182 EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Center. “Secure Flight.” EPIC. http://www.epic.org/
privacy/airtravel/secureflight.html. (Accessed July 19, 2014). 
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The previous analysis shows that these factors are substantially demonstrated by 
the Secure Flight program. This case study thus supports the development and 
implementation of automation tools for immigration adjudications. 
  
 50 
III. AUTOMATED CONTINUOUS EVALUATION SYSTEM 
(ACES) CASE STUDY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The United States Congress targeted longstanding problems with the timeliness 
and coordination of procedures for investigating and adjudicating national security 
clearances with mandates in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 
2004 (IRTPA).183 Through the IRTPA, Congress challenged federal government 
agencies to improve processing of security clearances, including evaluating the use of 
“available information technology and databases” to expedite investigative and 
adjudicative procedures and to “verify standard information submitted as part of an 
application for a security clearance.”184 The Automated Continuous Evaluation System 
(ACES), developed by the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center 
(PERSEREC), is a decision support system (DSS) that can be used to automate certain 
procedures to accelerate the processing of security clearance eligibility determinations.185  
1. Program Mission 
Inefficiencies in the federal personnel security system have been the target of 
reformers for decades. The attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted these inefficiencies 
and brought attention to the need for reform. The terror attack produced a “flood of 
additional security clearance requests”186 that threatened to overwhelm the personnel 
security system by adding to the backlog of overdue clearance decisions. Congress 
183 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o 
et. seq. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Erik L. Lang. Adjudication Decision Support (ADS) System Automated Approval Estimates for 
NACLC Investigations. Technical Report 07–04.  (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research 
Center (PERSEREC), May 2007). http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr07-04.pdf.  
186 Leissa C. Nelson and Samantha A. Smith-Pritchard. Baseline Suitability Analysis. Technical 
Report 13–05. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), July 2013). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751526.  
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responded by passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)187 
in December 2004. IRTPA set aggressive mandates for improving procedures for 
granting security clearances including specific timelines for completing background 
investigations and adjudications. At that time, there was a tremendous national backlog of 
pending security clearance determinations.188 Additionally, in 2005, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), which had been critical of the security clearance process 
for years, placed the Department of Defense’s personnel security system on its “High 
Risk List.”189 Programs on this list are monitored closely until improvements satisfy 
GAO evaluators.  
These two factors prompted earnest efforts to reform the personnel security 
system across the federal government. In June 2007, the Joint Security Process Reform 
Team was formed by a memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).190 Issued in June 
2008, Presidential Executive Order 13467191 expanded the Joint Security Process Reform 
Team to include the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) and established the Performance Accountability Council 
(PAC). The PAC, comprised of representatives of all the aforementioned executive 
187 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o 
et. seq. 
188 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
189 U.S. Government Accountability Office. High-Risk Series: An Update. (GAO-05-207) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207.  
190 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made 
to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. (GAO-11-65) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2011). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-65.  
191 Executive Order no. 13467 of June 30, 2008, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for 
Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 
National Security Information. Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, part 13467, (2008). 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/EO_13467.pdf.  
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agencies and chaired by the Deputy Director for Management, OMB, is accountable to 
the President and drives reform efforts and oversees their implementation.192  
The Executive Order requested a reform proposal to make hiring and clearing 
decisions more quickly, effectively, and efficiently, and to achieve the mandates of 
IRTPA.193 These mandates are: 
• Ensure that background investigations and clearance determinations 
completed by an authorized investigative agency or authorized 
adjudicative agency are transferable and accepted by all other agencies 
with equivalent or lesser requirements. 
• Establish and operate an integrated, secure database for storing 
information relevant to the granting, denial or revocation of security or 
suitability clearances from all authorized agencies. 
• Evaluate and leverage information technology and databases to expedite 
investigative and adjudicative processes. 
• Meet specific timeliness goals, such as making end-to-end determinations 
on 90% of clearance requests within an average of 60 days.194 
The names used to refer to the conglomeration of agencies and the program to 
reform security and suitability processes have evolved. The “Joint Security Process 
Reform Team,” then later the “The Joint Suitability and Security Clearance Reform 
Effort,” is now generally referred to as the “Joint Reform Effort” or “JRE.” The 
leadership of the Executive Branch entities involved in the program is now called the 
“Performance Accountability Council” (PAC). This analysis will refer to the program of 
reform as the “JRE” and the team of leaders as the “PAC.” 
192 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf.  
193 Leissa C. Nelson and Samantha A. Smith-Pritchard. Baseline Suitability Analysis. Technical 
Report 13–05. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), July 2013). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751526. 
194 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC), Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf.  
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2. Background 
Security and Suitability Clearances 
A “security clearance” is a determination that an individual—whether a direct 
federal employee or a private contractor performing work for the government—is eligible 
for access to classified national security information. A background investigation and 
adjudication process is conducted for candidates for security clearances in an effort to 
ensure that classified information is entrusted only to those “who have proven reliability 
and loyalty to the nation”195 because its disclosure may have the potential to cause grave 
damage to national security if disclosed. In addition to the appropriate level of clearance, 
an individual must also have a demonstrated “need to know” the information contained in 
classified materials for their job duties.196 
There are three general levels of security clearances. They correspond to the 
levels of sensitivity of the information that a cleared individual is eligible to access: 
Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret (TS). In addition, individuals with TS level 
clearance may be approved for access to particularly vulnerable information categorized 
as Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) and/or Special Access Programs 
(SAP).197 
“Suitability” refers to a determination that individuals seeking employment with 
the United States federal government will “perform their duties with integrity and 
promote the common good of the public and the agency they serve.”198 This 
determination also requires an investigation and adjudication. Clearance and suitability 
determinations remain valid for a specified number of years after the completion of the 
195 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused 
Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. (GAO-09-488) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2009). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488 . 
196 Michelle D. Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser, Security Clearance Process: Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions, (CRS Report RL R43216) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Research Service, September 9, 2013). http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.pdf. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Leissa C. Nelson and Samantha A. Smith-Pritchard. Baseline Suitability Analysis. Technical 
Report 13–05. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), July 2013). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751526.   
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investigation; then, periodic reinvestigations are required. Periodic reinvestigation cycles 
differ by level of clearance. For example, an individual holding a Secret clearance must 
be reinvestigated at least once every 10 years; an individual holding a Top Secret 
Clearance must be reinvestigated at least once every 5 years.”199 Nearly 5 million federal 
employees and contractors hold Secret or Top Secret security clearances.200  
Investigation and adjudication requirements and processes  
There are different levels of investigation. Eligibility standards and investigative 
requirements depend on the clearance level being sought for a prospective employee.201 
The specific standards and requirements for a clearance level or suitability determination 
are national security information, and thus are classified. As an example, the 
investigation for a TS/SCI clearance might involve a polygraph test while an 
investigation for a Secret clearance likely would not.  
On August 29, 2011, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) published 
revised National Investigative Standards. The “Federal Investigations Notice” announced 
full implementation of updated procedures in an effort to align clearance levels and 
investigative requirements across the federal government, facilitating reciprocity, as 
required by IRTPA. The updated procedures were initially agreed upon by OPM and 
ODNI on August 24, 2010, and fully implemented October 1, 2011.202 Table 1 
199 U.S. Government Accountability Office. More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance 
Reinvestigations is Needed. (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000). http://gao.gov/assets/
110/108657.pdf. Also see: U.S. Government Accountability Office. Personnel Security Clearances: 
Continuing Leadership and Attention Can Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. (GAO-12-
815T) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012). http://gao.gov/assets/600/591784.pdf.  
200 Peter Eisler and Tom Vanden Brook. “Security clearances: Holes in the system?” USA Today. 
September 30, 2013. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/30/problems-with-security-
clearances/2897303/.  (Accessed July 5, 2014). See also Suitability and Security Process Review Report to 
the President. February 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-
security-process-review-report.pdf. 
201Michelle D. Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser, Security Clearance Process: Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions. (CRS Report RL R43216) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Research Service, September 9, 2013). http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.pdf. 
202 United States Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services. “Continuous 
Efforts to Align with Reciprocity Goals and Timeliness Standards.” Federal Investigations Notice 11–04. 
August 29, 2011. http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/federal-investigations-
notices/2011/fin11-04.pdf. 
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demonstrates how the investigative requirements increase with a higher level of 
clearance:  
Table 1.   Tiered Investigative Model (after OPM, 2011)203 
Both personnel security and suitability investigation processes rely on similar 
background data, but historically the processes and determinations have not been well 
coordinated, nor have results or data been shared to facilitate employment movement 
between agencies or even positions within agencies.204 Executive Order 13467205 
203 United States Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services. “Continuous 
Efforts to Align with Reciprocity Goals and Timeliness Standards.” Federal Investigations Notice 11–04. 
August 29, 2011. http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/federal-investigations-
notices/2011/fin11-04.pdf.  
204 Leissa C. Nelson and Samantha A. Smith-Pritchard. Baseline Suitability Analysis. Technical 
Report 13–05. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC). July 2013). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=751526.  
LEVEL POSITION FORM INVESTIGATION REINVESTIGATION 
Tier 1 Low Risk Non-sensitive, including 
HSPD-12 Credentialing 
SF85 NACI None 
Tier 2a Low Risk Non-critical sensitive, 
including Confidential, Secret, & L 
access eligibility for contractors & 
military 
SF86 NACLC NACLC every 10 years 
Tier 2b Low Risk Non-critical Sensitive, 
including Confidential, Secret, & L 
access eligibility for federal employees 
SF86 ANICI NACLC every 10 years 
Tier 3a Moderate Risk PT Non-sensitive SF85P MBI NACLC every 5 years 
Tier 3b Moderate Risk PT Non-critical 
Sensitive, including Confidential, 
Secret, & L access eligibility 
SF86 MBI NACLC every 5 years 
Tier 4a High Risk PT Non-sensitive SF85P BI PRI every 5 years 
Tier 4b High Risk PT Non-critical Sensitive, 
including Confidential, Secret, & L 
access eligibility 
SF86 BI PRI every 5 years 
Tier 5 Any risk level Critical Sensitive or 
Special Sensitive, including Top 
Secret, SCI, and Q access eligibility 
SF86 SSBI SSBI-PR or PPR every 
5 years 
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included a request to bring these processes into better alignment, and the PAC committed 
to this goal in the 2010 Strategic Framework. Because of their similarities, the 
investigative and adjudicative processes for security clearances and suitability will be 
referenced as the “clearance process.” For analytical purposes of this thesis, the steps in 
these processes that could be supported with automation or decision support tools are 
generally the same. 
The clearance process involves a number of stages. The key steps are request, 
investigation, adjudication, and reinvestigation. 
• Request. During this phase, a sponsoring agency determines that an 
employee or contractor requires an investigation. For a security clearance, 
an individual will submit all information required on the Standard Form 
86 (SF-86). For a suitability determination, an individual submits all 
required information on the Standard Form 85P (SF-85P).206 
• Investigation. Using the information provided by the applicant in his or 
her clearance application materials, a background investigation of the 
applicant is conducted. The background investigation may vary in terms of 
content, cost, and length of time for completion depending, in part, on the 
level of clearance being sought.207 
• Adjudication. During the adjudication phase, the sponsoring agency uses 
information obtained in the investigation to decide whether to grant a 
security clearance or favorable suitability determination. 
• Reinvestigation. Individuals are subject to periodic reinvestigations to 
maintain clearances. The frequency of reinvestigations varies by level of 
clearance and may vary across agencies. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the basic phases of the process for an initial clearance or 
suitability determination. 
205 Executive Order no. 13467 of June 30, 2008, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for 
Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 
National Security Information. Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, part 13467, (2008). 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/EO_13467.pdf. 
206 Federal government positions covered by 5, Code of Federal Regulations, part 731 (5 CFR 731) 
are those in the competitive service, those in the excepted service where the incumbent can be 
noncompetitively converted to the competitive service, or a career appointment to the Senior Executive 
Service. Investigative requirements are described at 5 CFR 731.104. Under 5 CFR 731. 
207Michelle D. Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser, Security Clearance Process: Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions. (CRS Report RL R43216) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Research Service, September 9, 2013). http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.pdf. 
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Figure 6.  Initial Security Clearance or Suitability Investigation (from USA Today, 
2013)208 
3. Accomplishments and Plans 
Since its inception in 2007, the JRE has implemented several changes in the 
clearance process to meet the goals of the IRTPA. A Security and Suitability Strategic 
Framework, published in February 2010,209 has been guiding activities of the PAC and 
its member agencies. The Strategic Framework outlined overarching reform goals. 
Many of the goals outlined in the Strategic Framework related directly to the 
mandates of IRTPA, such as Goal 1: Reciprocity, Goal 2: Development of an Integrated 
Database, and Goal 4: Timeliness. The Framework also identified process alignment and 
quality as goals 5 and 7, respectively. 
According to IRTPA, “leveraging information technology” has been a major 
strategy for improving the clearance process. Even before the IRTPA, The 9/11 
Commission Report recommended that the federal government “evaluate the use of 
available information technology and databases to expedite investigative and adjudicative 
processes for all and to verify standard information submitted as part of an application for 
208 Peter Eisler and Tom Vanden Brook. “Security clearances: Holes in the system?” USA Today. 
September 30, 2013. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/30/problems-with-security-
clearances/2897303/ . (Accessed July 5, 2014). 
209 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf. 
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a security clearance.”210 With the publication of the Strategic Framework, the use of 
automation tools became an explicit goal for reform. Goal 3 identifies “IT/End-to-End 
Automation” and Goal 6 is “Continuous Evaluation.”211 
The PAC set out to achieve these goals with a vision for seven identified phases 
of processing. Figure 7 depicts the seven phases: 
 
Figure 7.  Security and Suitability Reform Strategic Framework (from JRE, 2008)212 
In its vision for a reformed system, the JRE specified procedures for using 
automation decision support tools and modified investigative procedures. The JRE 
identified “automated records checks” (ARC) that it envisioned would “provide an 
automated process to run subject data against appropriate government and validated 
commercial databases to collect, analyze, and validate data.”213 It further specified a 
“case flagging strategy,” such that any issues discovered during ARC would trigger an 
“Expandable Focused Investigation” (EFI). As opposed to the previous approach of 
routinely pursuing all information in a case, EFI was intended to focus investigative field 
resources only on those potential issues discovered through ARC. This focused approach 
was expected to result in process efficiency and improved timelines. The revised 
investigative standards published in 2011 mandated an EFI at all tiers when issue cases 
210 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o 
et. seq.  
211 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Ibid.  
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are flagged. The JRE expected this combined strategy to provide “cost, consistency, and 
time efficiencies.”214  
In addition to using ARC for initial clearance investigations, the JRE planned to 
more frequently evaluate personnel who have access to classified information with 
improved Continuous Evaluation (CE) processes and standards. The vision for CE has 
been to keep the process streamlined, utilizing EFI only if issues were discovered during 
ARC. 
4. Continuous Improvement 
Significant overall progress has been made to improve the investigation and 
adjudication of personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner. The GAO 
reported in 2010 that the “majority of clearances” are processed within the IRTPA 
established goal of 60 days. At that time, certain agencies continued to face challenges in 
meeting timeliness objectives.215  
The Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) 
OPM, which conducts approximately 95 percent of the total background investigations 
government-wide,216 cites “program efficiencies and expanded use of technology” as 
keys to achieving and sustaining timeline goals.217 As part of the reform process and as 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission that a “single federal agency”218 be responsible 
214 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf . 
215 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made 
to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. (GAO-11-65) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-65.  
216 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf. 
217 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
218 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). 
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for clearance processing, most clearance investigations have been brought under OPM-
FIS. 
Recent events involving individuals holding security clearances have raised 
concerns about “missed red flags” in background investigations.219 The tragic event at 
the Washington Navy Yard, where 34-year-old IT contractor Aaron Alexis opened fire 
and killed 12 people, as well as the disclosure of classified information by National 
Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden, have drawn public attention to the 
clearance process. 
Efforts to improve the timeliness, efficiency, and quality of the clearance process 
have proven challenging, and the GAO continues to identify opportunities for continuous 
improvement.220 In February 2014, the White House released an interagency review of 
the federal security clearance process.221 Two priorities recommended in the report 
include implementing continuous evaluation (CE) improvements and improving access to 
relevant information, especially state and local law enforcement records.222 The JRE’s 
vision for CE in the reformed process includes the implementation of automated records 
checks of commercial databases, government databases, and other information lawfully 
available.223 
219 Jack Moore. Federal News Radio Online. “White House backs 13 recommendations to improve 
security clearance process.” March 19 2014. http://www.federalnewsradio.com/520/3585372/White-House-
backs-13-recommendations-to-improve-security-clearance-process . 
220 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made 
to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. (GAO-11-65) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-65. 
221 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf. 
222 Jack Moore. Federal News Radio Online. “White House backs 13 recommendations to improve 
security clearance process.” March 19 2014. http://www.federalnewsradio.com/520/3585372/White-House-
backs-13-recommendations-to-improve-security-clearance-process.  




                                                 
B. USE OF AUTOMATION AND DECISION-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
The Security and Suitability Process Reform Strategic Framework released in 
February 2010 specified the evaluation and piloting of a system developed by Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) called the Automated Continuous 
Evaluation System (ACES) in several ARC and CE applications, such as: 
• integrate ACES records checks into an ARC product line for the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), 
• pilot ARC capability for processing government and commercial 
databases, 
• evaluate ARC capability for enabling the “flagging strategy” and EFI, 
• pilot ACES at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and State 
Department, 
• validate ARC for annual CE for individuals cleared at TS/SCI, and  
• pilot ACES CE Capability within DOD.224 
JRE member agency DOD had invested in research into automated records checks 
since 1999 when it requested that PERSEREC plan a prototype.225 In 2008, the JRE 
identified ACES for inclusion in the reformed federal security clearance process,226 and 
the direction of ACES research and development shifted to reflect the goals of the JRE 
and the emerging national program.227   
224 Security and Suitability Performance Accountability Council (PAC). Security and Suitability 
Process Reform Strategic Framework. (Washington, DC: Security and Sustainability Performance 
Accountability Council, February 2010). http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/OMB/
Security_and_Suitability_Process_Reform-Strategic_Framework.pdf . 
225 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
226 Ibid. 
227 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
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Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES)  
The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) developed 
the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES). ACES is an automated system 
that can check an applicant against 40 government and commercial databases. It uses an 
applicant’s personally identifiable information (PII) or responses provided on the 
Standard Form 86 (SF-86) or Standard Form 85P (SF-85P) against these data sources to 
locate potentially adverse information, verify what has been submitted, and collect more 
information in those systems. It applies business rules to data and produces a report that 
flags issues of potential security concern. The report is then transmitted to an approved 
adjudicator or facility.228 
Since its beginnings in the late 1990s, ACES has evolved through iterations of 
research and beta testing which began in 2005.229 When it was identified for use in ARC 
by the JRE in 2009, researchers began several pilot studies to demonstrate ACES’ 
capabilities for various federal agencies with different types of investigations.230 
According to developers, these pilot projects demonstrated that ACES can “streamline 
the expensive security clearance and suitability vetting process” and reduce processing 
costs.231 Research validated the use of ARC to flag issues up front, allowing field 
investigative resources to focus on cases with issues.232  
ARC  
Automated records checks have been implemented at the Office of Personnel 
Management. In her testimony before the 111th Congress in 2010, Associate Director for 
OPM Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) Kathy L. Dillaman stated that 
228  Ibid. 
229 Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC). “Past Achievements.” 
http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/pastachievements.html#ACES_2014. (Accessed July 5, 2014). 
230 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
231 Ibid. 
232 Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team. “Security and Suitability Process Reform.” December 
2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/reports/joint_security_dec2008.pdf.  
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“investigations to support a Secret level security clearance include automated and manual 
checks of criminal history, terrorist activities, credit, and foreign activities and influence. 
When the checks identify issues of concern, additional checks, including interviews and 
other more manual efforts, are conducted as needed.”233 The conversion from manual to 
automated records checks has allowed OPM to “use its investigative resources more 
effectively” and to “reduce costs and processing time.” Currently, it takes OPM an 
average of three days to complete these automated record checks.234  
EFI 
Implementation of EFI fell behind the initial schedule to be operational by 
September 2010. The most recent available information suggests that full implementation 
was intended for December 2013.235 However, the 2014 report to the White House 
suggested that EFI has been at least partially implemented. The report suggests that 
security clearance include “automated and manual checks of criminal history, terrorist 
activities, credit, and foreign activities and influence” and that “additional checks, 
including interviews and other more manual efforts” proceed when initial checks reveal 
issues of concern.236 
CE 
 As previously noted CE has not yet been fully implemented. Several pilot studies 
have been conducted to demonstrate ACES capabilities, including a test of 3,370 Army 
service members, civilian employees, and contractor personnel. This study identified 
233 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf. 
234 Kathy L. Dillaman, Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
235 William Henderson. “Federal Suitability and Security Clearance Reform Defense News.” 
September 21, 2010). http://news.clearancejobs.com/2010/09/21/federal-security-and-suitability-process-
reform/. (Accessed July 25, 2014). 




                                                 
previously unreported derogatory information for 21.7 percent of the tested population 
that had developed since the last investigation. Serious derogatory information that 
resulted in a revocation or suspension of a security clearance was identified for 3 percent 
of that population.237 The testimony of OPM-FIS Associate Director Dillaman seems to 
suggest that CE is at least partially implemented at that agency. Dillaman refers to an 
“investigation product” utilizing automated records checks for annual assessments of 
individuals with TS clearance.238 
1. Development Status and System Performance 
Automated records checks using the ACES tool are partially implemented in the 
security clearance process. Expanding the use of automation and decision support tools 
for clearance processing is being piloted and tested in several instances throughout the 
federal government. The federal government has benefited from the fact that automation 
research was well underway at the time the JRE prioritized its implementation. Given the 
success of the pilots, it is likely that agencies will leverage proven, existing tools like 
ACES rather than build others. Implementing ARC for both initial investigations and CE 
is a significant step towards the JRE’s goal of end-to-end automation.  
The performance of ARC in the clearance process is being demonstrated at OPM, 
which provides background investigations for over 100 federal agencies. OPM-FIS now 
utilizes automated systems with “demonstrated ample capacity to efficiently handle this 
demanding workload.”239 
237 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf.  
238 Kathy L. Dillaman, Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
239 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/.  
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 Pilot projects and tests of the ACES system are underway that incorporate 
automated credit checks, personnel records and even social media screenings. For 
example, the Defense Department recently sampled more than 3,300 Army service 
members, civilian employees and contractors using its Automated Continuous Evaluation 
System (ACES). That review turned up previously unreported derogatory information on 
more than 21 percent of the employees sampled and serious issues, such as domestic 
abuse or drug abuse, in 3 percent of the clearance holders surveyed.”240 
C. ANALYSIS 
The use of DSS to automate records checks for individuals who are being 
examined for a security clearance by automatically clearing those with no derogatory 
information or flagging and referring those that have issues for in-depth review offers 
several benefits to stakeholders. These include improvements to processing times, 
national security benefits through risk reduction, and direct operational efficiencies to the 
agencies responsible for processing clearances. Costs for this model are generally related 
to systems development. 
1. Benefits and Costs to Stakeholders 
a. Benefits to Federal Agencies 
Federal agencies and contractors sponsoring a candidate for a security clearance 
are the primary beneficiaries of DSS for security clearance investigations and 
adjudications. There are interrelated national security benefits to the efficient automated 
processing of security clearances, such as ensuring the integrity of the work performed at 
these agencies and securing their classified information. National security benefits related 
to the implementation of automation in security clearance processing will be examined 
separately in a later section.  
Typically, the requesting agency pays for background investigations of federal 
employees and contractor employees. As stated above, the vast majority of federal 
240 Jack Moore. Federal News Radio Online. “White House Backs 13 Recommendations to Improve 
Security Clearance process.” March 19 2014. http://www.federalnewsradio.com/520/3585372/White-
House-backs-13-recommendations-to-improve-security-clearance-process  
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background investigations (over 90%) are handled by OPM-FIS, which charges other 
federal agencies for the investigations it oversees.241 The cost of background 
investigations vary depending on the level of clearance requested and the scope of the 
investigation conducted.242 Whether or not automation would affect these fees is 
unknown and relatively unlikely; however, the time saved in anticipating and 
adjudicating a clearance has a cost or resource savings to federal agencies and 
contractors. 
When a federal agency makes an offer of employment to an individual, that 
person is not permitted to “enter on duty” (EOD) until a suitability or clearance 
determination is made. In some cases, a preliminary determination can be made to allow 
an individual to begin work, but only on activities not requiring access to classified 
information. In many cases, an individual must wait for a complete adjudication, and the 
sponsoring agency must wait as well. The agency must then operate with vacancies until 
the individual is cleared to EOD. This has a negative impact on the agency’s productivity. 
For contracting companies, an individual may be employed for an extended period of 
time on non-billable work until an adjudication can be made. Reducing the amount of 
time to a final adjudication through the use of automation and DSS would benefit the 
productivity of the sponsoring federal agencies and the profitability of contracting firms.  
b. Costs to Federal Agencies 
Training costs 
Personnel security offices within federal agencies may be required to learn new 
systems to review or retrieve results that are generated by automated systems or 
communicated electronically from OPM investigators. Often, access to sensitive systems 
241 A summary of the investigative products offered by OPM-FIS is available at http://www.opm.gov/
investigations/background-investigations/reference/annual-report-for-fiscal-year-2012.pdf.  
242 OPM’s Investigations Reimbursable Billing Rates for FY2013 are available at 
http://www.opm.gov/investigations/ background-investigations/federal-investigations-notices/2012/fin12-
07.pdf. OPM’s “Position Designation Tool,” which provides agencies with guidelines for determining the 




                                                 
requires federal employees to maintain current training records for continued access. 
These training costs may include recurring activities and resources.  
c. Benefits to Individuals Being Investigated 
Reduced processing time 
An individual being investigated for a security or suitability clearance realizes 
similar benefits to those of the employing agency or contracting firm in the form of time. 
First, with the potential to be cleared or approved automatically, an individual may be 
spared the time and cost of participating in an interview. Secondly, automated steps in the 
adjudication process may mean that a person can begin employment more quickly. This 
translates directly into earnings. Multiplying the average reduction in time from 
implementing DSS and the average salary of different types of federal and contractor 
employees could provide a rough calculation of the value of this benefit. However, at this 
time, there are no estimates of expected reduction in time to adjudication that automation 
would provide. 
Privacy Controls 
Misuses or breaches of national security systems or systems containing PII are 
both a security and privacy risk. Those with access to sensitive systems are required to 
maintain current training in privacy laws and usually must sign “Rules of Behavior”243 
forms that indicate they are familiar with the appropriate handling of PII. Access controls 
on closed systems also provide mechanisms for deterring internal abuse, often referred to 
as “insider threats.” As noted in the Privacy Impact Analysis for an ACES pilot with 
DHS in 2007:  
ACES user roles are highly restricted and audited. ACES employs role-
based access. Access to the ACES system is granted on a “need to know” 
basis. PERSEREC staff and contractors with access to ACES are required 
to complete security and data privacy training on an annual basis. Data on 
ACES may only be accessed by individual user account and password. 
Connectivity to external networks is tightly restricted to prevent the 
243 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. General Rules of Behavior for Users of DHS Systems and 
IT Resources that Access, Store, Receive, or Transmit Sensitive Information. (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, n.d.). http://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/behavior-rules.pdf  
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authorized transfer of ACES data outside the secure ACES network 
enclave. System security logs are audited on a regular basis to ensure 
compliance with all privacy and data security requirements.244  
Presumably, these privacy and security controls have been maintained as ACES 
has been expanded beyond pilots and test environments. 
It is important to note that when an individual consents to a background 
investigation in support of an application for a security clearance, he or she must sign an 
“Authorization for Release of Information.”245 An individual has the right to decline to 
provide his or her personal information, but doing so means the individual cannot be 
granted a security clearance. Furthermore, under Executive Order 12968, “Access to 
Classified Information,” all employees are subject to investigation by an appropriate 
government authority “prior to and at any time during the period of access to determine 
whether they continue to meet the requirements for access.” Individuals undergoing 
background investigations have due process rights under Section 5.2 of Executive Order 
12968, including the opportunity to correct errors, provide mitigating information, or 
appeal a negative adjudication.246 
ACES checks are only conducted on people who have signed an Authorization for 
Release of Information that is still valid at the time the record checks are performed. 
Signing the release and both seeking and maintaining national security clearances are 
voluntary acts. As specified in the DHS PIA, “ACES does not change these requirements 
and merely automates the searches.”247 
244 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) Pilot.” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 9, 2007). https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhs_aces.pdf 
245 See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” 
Standard Form 86, 5 CFR Parts 731, 732, and 738. Revised December 2010. http://www.opm.gov/forms/
pdf_fill/SF86.pdf  
246 Executive Order 12968 of August 4, 1995.  “Access to Classified Information.” Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 3, part 12968, (1995). http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/EO_12968.pdf.  
247 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) Pilot.” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 9, 2007). https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhs_aces.pdf.  
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d. Costs to Individuals Being Investigated 
Training costs 
Individuals submitting information for a security clearance or reinvestigation may 
be required to learn a new system to input their personal information. If the system is 
updated between reinvestigations, an individual may need to invest time to relearn how to 
enter data.  
2. Benefits and Costs to Operations 
a. Benefits to Operations 
Cost reduction and resource alignment 
PERESERC documents claim that “ACES will streamline the expensive security 
clearance and suitability vetting process and greatly reduce its cost.”248Additionally, the 
JRE believes that the use of ARC will provide “cost and time efficiencies compared with 
manual investigative activities.”249 The two overarching benefits of automation support 
this claim. The first of these is the extent to which automated checks of systems is faster 
than manually checking all the systems included in ARC. OPM-FIS Associate Director 
for OPM Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) Kathy L. Dillaman stated that ARC 
takes “an average of three days,”250 but data on the duration of manual records checks 
was not provided. Presumably, 3 days was an improvement over the previous procedure, 
and thus a direct benefit to the agency. 
The second benefit supporting cost reduction claims is the extent to which 
resources are reduced due to the use of a “case flagging strategy.” The JRE 
248 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
249 Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team. Security and Suitability Process Reform Initial 
Report. April 30, 2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/
reform_plan_report_2008.pdf.  
250 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
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recommendations specifically included Automated Records Checks (ARC) and a “case 
flagging strategy” in the “Security and Suitability Process Reform” document submitted 
in December 2008.251 The strategy entails using ARC to “identify cases requiring human 
investigation and adjudication” and then using electronic adjudication (eAdjudication) for 
“clean cases” with no flagged issues. This strategy implies that human investigations and 
adjudications are not utilized in the same capacity for the evaluation of all security 
clearances, whether initial requests or periodic reinvestigations. As of February 2014, 
much of this strategy has been implemented. Security clearance investigations include 
“automated and manual checks of criminal history, terrorist activities, credit, and foreign 
activities and influence.”252 When these checks identify issues of concern, “additional 
checks, including interviews and other more manual efforts, are conducted as needed.253 
The JRE notes the “transition to automated case flagging” is driven by the “results 
of several research efforts.”254 The research showed that the flagging strategy, as 
described, is as effective as traditional field leads at identifying cases with issues. The 
case flagging strategy, in concert with Expandable Focused Investigation (EFI) methods, 
focuses investigative resources on the cases that need additional scrutiny. It reduces the 
use of human resources needed to conduct investigations and adjudications, and it results 
in a reduction of operational costs for the agencies responsible for processing security 
clearances. When known non-productive investigative activity is eliminated and 
investigative resources are able to appropriately focus on the issues that need them most, 
cost is reduced and timeliness is improved. This may also improve national security, as 
discussed later. 
The Strategic Framework also proposed robust and expanded continuous 
evaluation (CE). The goal for implementing CE remains unmet as of 2014 when the 
251 Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team. “Security and Suitability Process Reform.” December 
2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/reports/joint_security_dec2008.pdf. 






                                                 
Office of Management and Budget reviewed the initiative,255 but it remains a goal of the 
JRE and is likely to be implemented. Expanded CE investigations would result in an 
increase in overall clearance workload. The use of ARC for CE in conjunction with a 
case flagging strategy would allow OPM to align resources and utilize human 
adjudicators for only those cases with flagged issues. Cost reductions and resource 
alignments from implementing ARC might not fully compensate for the increased 
workload resulting from implementing CE, but it would allow for efficient alignment of 
resources in either situation or in response to other changes to reinvestigation policy and 
procedures. 
Efficient robust results 
As noted in the Secure Flight case study, reliability and efficiency refer to a 
model performing within a specified margin of error, minimizing false positives and false 
negatives. Throughout its evolution, ACES has been tested for performance against the 
traditional methods of investigation. Refinement of ACES business rules by adjudicators, 
security policy officials, and counter intelligence experts,256 and the inclusion of 
additional datasets, has improved the efficiency of results.257 The results of the studies 
performed by PERSEREC were so “promising”258 that in 2001 the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) encouraged continued development of ACES for 
implementation throughout the DOD. The actual business rules and performance 
statistics are not available in public documents, but the reliability of automated results 
from the ACES tool has been demonstrated and documented in multiple studies. As noted 
in PERSEREC documents, beta tests using ACES “found problems that investigators and 
255 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf 
256 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
257 Ibid. 
258 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
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other sources had not previously identified.”259 Reliable results improve operational 
efficiency by enabling a more optimal allocation of resources. This benefits OPM and 
other investigative agencies by limiting the use of EFI or other resource intensive 
investigative procedures to only those cases where it is necessary. 
b. Cost to Operations 
The cost of research and development of ACES is difficult to compile. ACES has 
been in development for at least 10 years, and specific budget information for ACES 
versus other projects conducted by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center 
(PERSEREC) are not readily available in public documents.  
It is reasonable to conclude that the ACES research and development represents a 
significant percentage of work conducted by PERSEREC. The Defense Human 
Resources Activity (DHRA) budget estimate for fiscal year 2014 lists the first two goals 
for PERSEREC as: 
Goal 1: Further develop a reliable and effective system for conducting 
automated data base checks to eliminate paper-based manual procedures 
and increase the availability of relevant personnel suitability and security 
information for the vetting and continuing evaluation of military and 
civilian personnel.  
Goal 2: Further develop automation and quality standards to improve the 
effectiveness of personnel suitability and security investigation processing 
and electronic adjudication of clean investigations.260 
PERSEREC was established in 1986 to improve the “effectiveness, efficiency, 
and fairness”261 of DOD personnel security systems. Department of Defense Directive 
5210.79 (1992) reissued PERSEREC’s mission to serve as the “DOD personnel security 
259 Ibid. 
260 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year 2014 Budget 
Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013).  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
Documents/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdf/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/
O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/DHRA_OP-5.pdf . 
261 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), DOD 
Directive 5210.79.1. (Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1992). http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/
d5210_79.htm.  
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research center for the Department of Defense.”262 As noted in the DHRA Budget, 
PERSEREC’s current work “supports the Performance Accountability Council” and 
reform of the personnel security clearance process.263 
Documentation of costs to support PERSEREC is limited and difficult to compile. 
Budget estimates from DHRA cite annual budgets for PERSEREC as high as $6.5 
million in fiscal year 2011,264 falling to $1.2 million in fiscal year 2012, and averaging 
about $550,000 for fiscal years 2013 and 2014.265 A Department of the Navy document 
cites PERSEREC’s fiscal year 2008 budget as $9.1 million,266 while DHRA documents 
state PERSEREC’s budget for that same year was $1.1 million.267 Older budgets have 
similar variability.268 
The ACES system has been in development for at least 10 years. It has been 
designed by researchers from PERSEREC in Monterey, CA, and defense contractor 
Northrop Grumman.269 An Associated Press report claims that ACES and “clearance-
262 Ibid. 
263 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2009). http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/
45/Documents/defbudget/fy2010/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/
O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/DHRA.pdf. 
264 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year 2013 Budget 
Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2012). http://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/
O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/O_M_VOL_1_BASE_PARTS/DHRA_OP-5.pdf.  
265 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year 2014 Budget 
Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2013). http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/
45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdf/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/
O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/DHRA_OP-5.pdf. 
266 U.S Department of Defense, Department of the Navy. Team Monterey Information & Statistics. 
(Unknown: November 2009). http://www.public.navy.mil/fltfor/cnmoc/Documents/
team_monterey_handouts.pdf . 
267 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2009). http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/
45/Documents/defbudget/fy2010/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/
O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/DHRA.pdf.  
268 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity. Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 
Biennial Budget Estimates. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2003). 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2004/dod/fy04pb_dhra.pdf.  
269 Stephen Braun. “U.S. intelligence officials to monitor federal employees with security clearances.” 
Associated Press. March 10, 2014.  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/us-intelligence-officials-
monitor-federal-employees-security-clearances/.  
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related Defense Department research”270 has cost more than $84 million271 according to 
“documents”272 that are not cited.  
Direct contact with PERSEREC staff suggested that ACES development budgets 
were “contract sensitive” and not available in public documents. The online publication 
“ClearanceJobs.com” notes that there is “no clear explanation” for how ACES is or will 
be funded273 and estimates the costs for the Department of Defense alone at 
approximately $53 million.274  
The Security and Suitability Process Reform Strategic Framework, issued in 
February 2010, states that: “Resources from DOD and OPM are sufficient to enable 
implementation of the transformed process design for the mainstream elements of the 
process, as guided by the PAC.”275 This does not clarify the costs of implementing 
automated tools for clearance processing. However, it assigns the tasks of 
implementation of ARC, CE, and other technology modernizations to these agencies to 
accomplish within their respective budgets and notes that “funding has been identified by 
each of these entities to support planned reforms.”276 
Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided guidance 
for fiscal year 2015 that required the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Homeland 
Security to “identify agency funding to prioritize automation requirements”277 to enable 
CE capabilities. OMB has stated that it is developing a cost estimate for the expansion 
270 Stephen Braun. “U.S. intelligence officials to monitor federal employees with security clearances.” 
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and implementation of CE beyond the DOD,278 but values are not yet available. Finally, 
OMB also has required the DOD to “fund development of the CE capability leveraging 
the ACES platform.”279 
Costs are difficult to compile for ACES development and both past and future 
PERSEREC research. Given the nearly 18-year history of PERSEREC and at least 10-
year history of ACES, annual budgets and other estimates would suggest that upwards of 
$100 million has been invested to date for research related to automated records checks 
for security clearance processing. Costs to expand pilot projects and fully develop and 
deploy CE capabilities could significantly add to what has already been invested. 
 However, the value of the existing research on ACES for the implementation of 
current programs is significant. Given the extensive history of research and testing 
already conducted on ACES, new projects need not take on full-scale testing. OPM and 
other agencies implementing ACES for ARC or CE programs will benefit from the 
investments made by DOD since PERSEREC began in 1986. 
3. Effects of Automation on National Security 
a. Benefits to National Security 
 Continuous Evaluation 
Under the direction of the President, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) conducted a review of the progress of clearance reform. OMB’s review noted 
that:  
Current reinvestigation practices do not adequately reevaluate or 
appropriately mitigate risk within the security and suitability population. 
Lengthy periods between reinvestigations do not provide sufficient means 
to discover derogatory information that develops following the initial 
adjudication. Furthermore, resource constraints lead agencies to conduct 
fewer than the required number of reinvestigations.280  
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 




                                                 
Continuous Evaluation (CE) remains a “vision” of the reformed security 
clearance process. It is not yet fully implemented. CE has been cited as a “critical 
element” for a robust security clearance process because of the long time intervals 
between periodic reinvestigations. As a result of these intervals, the government may be 
relatively uninformed as to behavior that poses a security or counterintelligence risk. 
Reducing this risk requires establishing an effective capability to assess an individual’s 
continuing eligibility on a more frequent basis. However, conducting this activity using 
manual checks or full field investigations would be “inefficient and resource 
intensive,”281 as noted by Brian A. Prioletti, an Assistant Director at ODNI, in an official 
statement to Congress. OPM Associate Director Dillaman believes that using ARC for 
CE is “a quick and cost effective method for assessing employees and supports a more 
robust continuous evaluation program.”282 Several CE pilots have been conducted or are 
underway as part of the JRE’s continued efforts for clearance reform. These should be 
implemented with a full-range of ARC and supporting EFI or other procedures to ensure 
that national security information is safeguarded. 
Prioletti and the JRE emphasize the importance of CE assessing an individual’s 
eligibility to hold a security clearance or sensitive position on an ongoing basis. As a 
further sign of its importance, Executive Order 13467283 and the revised Federal 
Investigative Standards authorized CE reviews of individuals in sensitive positions or 
with access to classified information “at any time” to ensure continued eligibility. CE 
initiatives could also deter “insider threats” by identifying unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information. 
281 Brian Prioletti. “Statement for the Record: Open Hearing on The Insider Threat to Homeland 
Security: Examining Our Nation’s Security Clearance Processes.” Counterterrorism and Intelligence 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security. November 13, 2013. http://fas.org/irp/congress/
2013_hr/111313prioletti.pdf.  (Accessed July 20, 2014). 
282 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
283 Executive Order no. 13467 of June 30, 2008, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for 
Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified 
National Security Information. Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, part 13467, (2008). 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/EO_13467.pdf.  
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Given that ARC has been demonstrated to be effective in identifying issues at a 
low cost, implementing regular ARC as part of CE—such as ACES electronic database 
checks—between initial clearances and periodic reinvestigations may mitigate some risks 
to national security. ARC could identify factors like financial or criminal issues within 
the population of federal civilian and military employees before a 5-year or 10-year 
investigation.  
Based on an ACES pilot of 3,370 Army uniformed, civilian, and contract 
employees that yielded precise and actionable results, the JRE plans to expand the use of 
ACES. The ODNI plans to develop capability to implement Continuous Evaluation (CE) 
for the most sensitive TS/SCI positions by the close of fiscal year 2014, with a full roll-
out expected by 2016.284 If completed, this expansion would likely reduce risks to 
national security. 
Incorporating more data 
ARC enables investigators to quickly review results from multiple data sources 
including government and commercial databases. Testing is underway to validate the use 
of additional information, such as screenings of social media. OPM states: “We are 
currently working with several new record repositories to establish agreements so that 
OPM can integrate these record checks into our investigations products.”285 
Incorporating additional sources of information to include in automated checks could 
enhance the quality and content of the investigations by improving the robustness of 
results. As new data relevant to hiring and clearing decisions becomes available, 
automation enables this data to be incorporated into the records checks.286 This has the 
284 Lindy Kyzer. “OMB Releases Security Clearance Reform Report.” ClearanceJobs.com. March 19, 
2014. http://news.clearancejobs.com/2014/03/19/opm-releases-security-clearance-reform-report/.  
285 Kathy L. Dillaman. Associate Director For Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel 
Management. Personnel Security Clearance Reform. Statement before the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Community Management, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives. December 1, 2010. http://www.opm.gov/news/testimony/111th-congress/personnel-
security-clearance-reform/. 
286 Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team. “Security and Suitability Process Reform.” December 
2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/reports/joint_security_dec2008.pdf.   
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potential to improve the clearance process and enhance national security by identifying 
derogatory information from sources that were previously unavailable. 
 Prioletti addresses some of the challenges with incorporating certain types of 
additional data, such as activity on social media sites, in his statement to Congress. As 
Prioletti notes, pilot studies on the feasibility and utility of this data “identified actionable 
information,” but “retrieving, analyzing, and processing”287 it was resource intensive. 
Furthermore, there may be some privacy or civil liberties issues associated with 
incorporating this kind of information. Including additional information into ARC must 
be supported by policy, procedure, and the appropriate use of resources in order to 
maintain ARC as an efficient tool for supporting clearance processes. 
Flexible, configurable systems 
Observations from testing ACES note that it is “configurable” to different 
business rules, and that the system can be “calibrated” to check different sources or 
systems with different business rules depending on the nature of the investigation.288 
Similar comments have been made about Secure Flight as this is a feature common to 
DSS. Calibrating the ARC criteria or sensitivity thresholds may be done temporarily, in 
response to an elevated threat environment, or permanently, based on new policy, 
improved logic, or the availability of new information. When these characteristics are 
configured and applied universally, there are certainly operational efficiencies, such as 
the reduction of costs related to training and implementing new procedures. Further, 
universal application of new policies across an electronic system—rather than a human 
system—reduces the risk that new policies will be incorrectly communicated and 
followed. Flexibility and rapid responsiveness in systems configuration has a positive 
287 Brian Prioletti. “Statement for the Record: Open Hearing on The Insider Threat to Homeland 
Security: Examining Our Nation’s Security Clearance Processes.” Counterterrorism and Intelligence 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security. November 13, 2013. http://fas.org/irp/congress/
2013_hr/111313prioletti.pdf. (Accessed July 20, 2014). 
288 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
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effect on national security, and this is enabled by the use of ARC of electronic databases 
with an automated system such as ACES.289 
b. Risks to National Security 
Data Access Issues 
The issue of access to data, such as the local police department records, is an 
important consideration when evaluating the benefits or risks to national security from 
utilizing ARC. Local records from the Seattle Police Department contained arrest 
information on Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis. If investigators had access to this 
information during his initial or reinvestigations, this may have affected his clearance 
adjudication.290  
Reliance on the results of ARC to enable EFI is only effective if investigators are 
confident that all relevant sources of information are included in the checks. That is, if a 
system of records cannot be included in ARC but the information contained in it would 
affect an adjudication, protocols must include checking this information in addition to the 
results of ARC. Efficiency is more optimal if the systems can be included, and OPM and 
other clearance investigators should pursue opportunities to include local law 
enforcement records or other relevant information in the ARC whenever possible. When 
it is not possible, thorough investigations to ensure national security should include 
protocols to manually check systems not included in ARC. Appropriate communication 
to field investigators that ARC is a tool that “supplements and does not replace”291 
investigations is important to maintain vigilance in the clearance process. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Suitability and Security Process Review Report to the President. February 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/suitability-and-security-process-review-
report.pdf. 
291 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) Pilot.” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 9, 2007). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhs_aces.pdf.  
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4. Findings 
The fundamental factors for evaluating the policy decision to implement 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures as outlined in the methodology 
for this analysis are: 
• expected benefits to stakeholders, 
• potential improvements in operational efficiency, and; 
• potential reduction of risks to national security. 
The previous analysis shows that these factors are substantially demonstrated by 
the ACES system. This case study also supports the development and implementation of 
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IV. AUTOMATION IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS 
A. ANALYSIS 
In their 2012 analysis, “The Effects of USCIS Adjudication Procedures and 
Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers,”292 the DHS OIG 
commented specifically on USCIS data systems. They noted that Immigration Services 
Officers (ISOs), in conducting background investigations on applicants for immigration 
benefits, must conduct “labor-intensive, system-by-system checks to verify or eliminate 
each possible match to terrorist watch lists and other derogatory information.”293 An 
earlier DHS OIG report in 2011 noted that this information on foreign nationals is 
fragmented among 17 data systems.294  
In addition to national security systems or criminal records databases, ISOs may 
also need to query certain records systems295 for verification of information provided in 
support of a benefit request. As noted in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual (public redacted 
version) ISOs were responsible for querying applicant aliases one by one prior to a final 
decision: “Checks must be performed on additional names or alternate dates of birth that 
become known during the adjudicative process.”296 ISOs were required to review internal 
files and the results of records checks in order to analyze and determine whether an 
292 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The Effects of USCIS 
Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers. (OIG-12-24) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
OIG_12-24_Jan12.pdf.  
293 Ibid. 
294 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Information Sharing on 
Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening. (OIG-11-68) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 2011). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_11-68_Apr11.pdf . 
295 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 




                                                 
applicant had aliases or variations of his or her name and then initiate checks on all 
variations they discovered.297 
As previously noted in this analysis, opportunities exist to improve the 
background investigations process through the use of automation and DSS. 
B. COMPARISON TO CASE STUDIES 
There are notable similarities between immigration adjudications processing and 
the two cases studied in this analysis. These are specified below to enable the 
extrapolation of expected benefits and costs of the proposal to implement automation and 
DSS in the immigration adjudications process. 
Though there are differences depending on the type of immigration benefit being 
requested, processing generally follows these phases: 
• Application. An individual submits an application for an immigration 
benefit. Depending on the type of benefit being requested, various 
supporting documentation or evidence is required. For certain requests, 
fingerprints or photos, called “biometrics,” must be collected. 
• Investigation. Using the information provided by the applicant in his or 
her clearance application materials, a background investigation of the 
applicant is conducted. Again, depending on the type of immigration 
benefit being requested, the depth of the investigation will vary. For many 
benefit types, the ISO will issue a “Request for Evidence” (RFE) to 
validate information provided by the applicant. Some benefit requests such 
as the form N-400 “Application for Naturalization” or form I-130, 
“Petition for Alien Relative,” require interviews to inform the 
adjudication.  
• Adjudication. After collecting all the necessary information, querying the 
appropriate systems, and potentially interviewing an applicant or 
petitioner, an ISO renders an adjudication on a request. The formal 
decision is written, and the decision notice is mailed and/or emailed to the 
applicant/petitioner. For some benefit types, adjudication may only 
involve a review of documentation for verification of eligibility.  
297 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Adjudicator’s Field Manual—Redacted Public Version. January 22, 2013. http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/
ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html.  
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• Post-Decision Activity. After the denial of an immigration benefit request, 
many applicants have the opportunity to appeal. Not all denials are eligible 
for appeal, however. The appeals process is complex and may involve 
reinvestigation of an applicant. Other post-decision activities include 
document production (such as an I-551 “Legal Permanent Resident Card,” 
or “Green Card”) or an Oath Ceremony, as in the case of an approved 
naturalization decision. 
The USCIS website, “My Case Status,” is an interactive site for applicants or 
petitioners to get information related to their immigration benefit request. An 
immigration benefit request is often referred to by the Agency as a “case.” The site 
describes several phases of processing, depicted in Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8.  USCIS “My Case Status” Processing Phases (from USCIS, 2014)298 
The phase that the Agency calls “Initial Review” is the investigations phase of the 
overall process. The Agency describes this phase as follows: 
During this step, USCIS initiates the background checks of the applicant/
petitioner and identifies issues that may need to be addressed either during 
an interview or by asking the applicant/petitioner to submit additional 
information or documentation. USCIS reviews the applicant’s/petitioner’s 
criminal history, determines if there are national security concerns that 
need to be addressed, and reviews the application/petition for fraud 
indicators.299 
298 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “My 
Case Status.” https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard/CaseStatus.do.   
299 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “My 
Case Status Descriptions.” https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard/CaseStatus/BucketDescriptions.do#2.  
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This phase presents several elements to compare with the vetting of airline 
passengers against the terror watch lists and the processing of security clearances. 
Multiple systems checks 
As noted by the DHS OIG, an ISO might check up to 17 systems with multiple 
aliases or other derogatory information on an applicant for national security. In addition, 
the ISO might check several internal systems to verify data that is supplied by an 
applicant. This process is similar to the system checks conducted by Secure Flight and 
ACES in their automated processing. As previously noted, Secure Flight checks 
passenger names against the No Fly and Selectee lists. ACES was originally designed to 
check as many as 40 systems and can be calibrated to include or exclude systems 
depending on the type of investigation being conducted.  
Aliases 
As noted, the Adjudicator’s Field Manual requires that an ISO check all 
discovered aliases in their investigation of an immigration benefit applicant. The use of 
aliases or spelling variations of an individual’s name increases the workload required to 
complete the investigation. Although the exact rules-based queries for both Secure Flight 
and ACES are sensitive or classified and not available in public documents, both systems 
must process checks on the identities of individuals who may use different names or 
aliases. Secure Flight has initiated standard data formats to minimize false positives; 
ACES pilots have utilized commercial databases and credit reports to generate aliases and 
then used those additional names in records checks.300 This element of background 
checking—the complication of queries based on name variations and aliases—is similar 
across all three processes. 
Referrals 
USCIS ISOs refer cases to Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) 
Immigration Officers (IOs) when their investigations reveal an articulable reason to 
300 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Privacy. “Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) Pilot.” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 9, 2007). https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhs_aces.pdf . 
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suspect fraud or national security concerns.301 FDNS IOs have access to additional 
national security commercial databases, and they may conduct other investigative 
activities to attempt to resolve a case.302 This process is very similar to the referral 
processes in both watch list matching and security clearance processing. For passengers 
who match the No Fly or Selectee lists via the automated matching system used by 
Secure Flight, their information is referred to a Secure Flight Analyst to try to resolve the 
case or coordinate other investigative or law enforcement activities. Automated records 
checks conducted in a security clearance review may provide direction for an Expandable 
Focused Investigation (EFI). 
A general model that can be derived from the two case studies can be represented 
by the flow chart in Figure 9. 
301 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Review of the USCIS Benefit 
Fraud Referral Process (Redacted – Revised). (OIG-08-09) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 2008). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf. 
302 Ibid. 
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Figure 9.  Use of Automation and Decision Support Tools in Investigative Procedures 
This model can be directly translated to immigration adjudication procedures. 
Upon receipt of an immigration benefit request and beginning the “Initial Review” or 
investigative phase of the adjudications process, automated system checks could be used 
to sort cases with no adverse information to a queue for adjudications. Depending on the 
complexity of the review required for that request type, the potential exists for immediate 
or even fully automated adjudication. If adverse information is found, a case can be 
sorted for further review. If an ISO or IO was able to resolve the adverse information 
with more in-depth review, the case could then be adjudicated. If a resolution could not 
be made or if the concern was confirmed, USCIS could coordinate a response with the 
appropriate law enforcement or national security authorities to appropriately address the 
concern.  
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C. EXPECTED BENEFITS AND COSTS 
As demonstrated, the model of automated system checks and referral procedures 
consequently applies to immigration benefit adjudications. The remaining questions, 
then, relate to the benefits and costs to stakeholders, the operational efficiencies, and the 
potential reduction of national security risks that could be realized if automation were 
implemented in immigration benefits adjudication.  
As previously mentioned, these elements are fundamental factors in evaluating 
the policy decision to implement automation tools for immigration adjudication 
procedures. The examined cases demonstrate that significant resources are required to 
implement and support automation and decision support tools. Using the same framework 
through which benefits and costs of Secure Flight and ACES have been analyzed thus far, 
the following sections will analyze “expected” benefits and costs of implementing 
automation and decision support tools for immigration adjudications. 
1. Benefits and Costs to Stakeholders 
a. Benefits to Applicants/Petitioners 
Faster and More Efficient Processing 
As demonstrated in the cases, automation and DSS can reduce the overall amount 
of time required for investigatory procedures. Reducing the time between application and 
adjudication provides a customer service benefit to applicants. While the Agency 
currently processes applications according to a culture of customer service, reducing the 
wait time for all requests improves Agency’s relationship with the immigrant community. 
For example, reuniting families faster or reducing the amount of time it takes to bring a 
petitioner’s foreign spouse into the country benefits these applicants, though this is quite 
difficult to measure. The Agency also benefits from improved applicant and immigrant 
relations.  
Further, if there were Agency policies and procedures that supported a “case 
flagging strategy” and that also supported expanded investigations only for applicants 
with derogatory information, an applicant might not be required to participate in an 
 89 
investigatory interview. If an automated system were designed to minimize false 
positives, perhaps by incorporating more data elements like the Secure Flight system 
does, a DSS could produce more robust and reliable results. While this undoubtedly 
would benefit operations and national security, it would also benefit applicants who have 
names or aliases that are similar to those who are KST. It would appropriately identify 
them as having no derogatory information, and thus not subject them to expanded 
investigations. 
Protecting Applicant Privacy 
Requiring adjudicators to access as many as 17 national security systems and 
additional records systems indicates that the process incorporates risks to information 
security and individual privacy. Though ISOs are trained in privacy laws each year and 
required to sign “Rules of Behavior” documents that indicate the appropriate use of PII, 
risks of intentional or accidental privacy or security breaches increase with every 
additional system that is accessed. Keeping PII and national security information within a 
closed system with access controls enhances both security and privacy. Access controls 
on closed systems also provide mechanisms for deterring internal abuse, often referred to 
as “insider threats.”303  
b. Costs to Applicants/Petitioners 
Compliance with data collection systems 
The implementation of automated system checks could potentially involve the 
means for electronically collecting information from applicants. In this case, applicants 
and petitioners or their authorized representatives and attorneys would need to learn how 
to enter information into the system. The training time to learn the system and enter their 
information is a direct cost to this stakeholder group if it is more extensive than filing via 
current paper methods. Furthermore, any changes or updates to the system over time 
would require retraining.  
303 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the National Counterintelligence 
Executive. “Insider Threat.” http://www.ncix.gov/issues/ithreat/.  (Accessed August 4, 2014). 
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Processing Fees 
If the Congress does not appropriate funds for the development of automation 
tools for immigration adjudications, the Agency might need to raise funds for its 
development. USCIS might raise fees to maintain Agency operations, transferring some 
of the cost to applicants. It is difficult to estimate these potential costs. Indeed the 
possibility exists that the implementation of automation will have such a positive impact 
on Agency operations that fee increases will be unnecessary. 
Personal Privacy Concessions 
Implementing an automated decision support tool for checking national security 
databases in support of current policies and procedures would have a neutral effect on 
privacy relative to the amount of information that adjudicators access on any individual. 
However, if additional information were incorporated into automated records checks—
due to the ease of calibration or availability of additional data sources—privacy 
regulations or documents may need to be updated.  
Applicants for immigration benefits acknowledge that their personal information 
may be accessed and reviewed when they sign and submit a request form. That being 
said, it is likely that privacy advocacy groups would have negative commentary on the 
incorporation of additional data into the adjudications process as a violation of privacy 
rights.  
2. Costs and Benefits to USCIS Operations from Automation in 
Immigration Adjudications 
a. Benefits to Operations 
Productivity Improvements 
Simply relieving officers of the need to check multiple systems will have a 
positive impact on their productivity by reducing the amount of time it takes to conduct 
an adjudication. There are additional benefits of utilizing an automated, centralized 
system for records checks related to training and access to systems. 
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Though there may be an initial training investment when an automated system is 
first deployed, minimizing the number of systems that adjudicators are required to access 
will reduce systems-related training hours in the long run. This applies to onboarding 
training as well as training due to system updates or periodic training as required by the 
Agency for access to sensitive systems. Furthermore, policy changes can impact training 
requirements. To the extent that policies can be translated into business rules that are 
programmed into an automated system, training to ensure compliance might also be 
reduced.  
Furthermore, time spent managing access to systems, such as recalling usernames 
or updating passwords, is minimized when automation centralizes system checks. As 
noted by the DHS OIG, access issues like lockouts, automatic logoffs, and varying 
password cycles makes managing access to multiple systems a time-consuming 
challenge.304 
DHS OIG noted that there is some potential for risk to information security and 
privacy when “officers whose passwords have lapsed ask their DHS colleagues to 
conduct searches for them.”305 A serious potential outcome is that an officer might 
forego certain system checks due to the difficulty in the process and thus not fully 
consider all available information in a case. This analysis will address consistency in 
checking all systems as well as calibrating a system to universally incorporate policy 
changes as benefits to national security in later sections. 
Resource alignment 
As previously analyzed with respect to Secure Flight and ACES, the use of a 
“case flagging strategy” may offer improvements to Agency operations due to the 
efficient alignment of resources that this strategy enables. The process outlined in Figure 
9 demonstrates how this strategy is relevant for immigration adjudications. Previous 
304 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The Effects of USCIS 
Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers.  (OIG-12-24) 




                                                 
analysis on this strategy for adjudications procedures for aviation security and clearance 
processing is applicable to immigration adjudications. The robustness of results further 
enhances the efficiency of resource alignment, and the Agency would do well to 
sufficiently test and refine the criteria and business rules that are incorporated into 
automated queries. 
Expansion of Agency Processing Capacity 
As noted, USCIS experienced a change in procedures in 2003 and an increase in 
receipts in advance of the changes to the N-400. The Agency will continually be subject 
to external factors impacting workload and procedures, not the least of which is the 
possibility of CIR. Both the Secure Flight and ACES cases demonstrate that DSS and 
automation enable and support high-capacity processing. The Secure Flight system vets 
as many as 14 million passengers each week.306 The ACES system was originally tested 
with small samples of data in pilot projects, but was “greatly expanded”307 in scope when 
the JRE prioritized automation. The volume of checks processed by ACES technology 
increased significantly. 
This thesis does not evaluate the capacity of the technological systems used for 
automation in the cases. However, the number and quality of system interfaces, the 
bandwidth of networks, and the processing capacity of information technology systems 
would all impact the speed at which automated checks could be performed. Systems 
analysts could determine the optimal capacity of these items to enable fast processing of 
background check information in immigration adjudications.  
b. Costs to Operations 
Investment of Resources 
As with Secure Flight and ACES, the development and implementation of an 
automation tool for system and records checks for immigration adjudications will have 
306 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security.” July 8, 
2013. http://www.dhs.gov/preventing-terrorism-and-enhancing-security. (Accessed May 26, 2014). 
307 Eric L. Lang. The Evolution of the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES) for 
Personnel Security. (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), 
September 2013). 
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real costs in dollars and other resources. As noted by DHS OIG in a 2014 report on 
information technology (IT) management, USCIS’s IT spending in fiscal year 2012 
totaled approximately $379 million.308 While this value covers all IT spending 
throughout the Agency, including operations and maintenance costs on existing systems 
as well as hardware maintenance and replacement costs, this is not an insignificant 
budget. 
USCIS is currently undertaking a large-scale IT development and implementation 
program called “Transformation” that is intended to “modernize USCIS by transitioning 
the Agency from a fragmented, paper-based environment to a centralized, paperless 
environment using electronic adjudication.”309 The system that is being developed, called 
“USCIS ELIS,” is a candidate platform in which to incorporate automated system and 
records checks. In fact, in USCIS ELIS was originally envisioned to include this 
functionality. As noted by DHS OIG in a progress review of the program in 2012, USCIS 
ELIS was originally planned to “fully automate the entire benefits process, such as 
automatically assigning work to USCIS employees and automatically checking for 
potential criminal and fraudulent activity.”310 “Automated fraud detection”311 through a 
“risk analyzer”312 was intended to address issues related to the use of different names and 
aliases by individuals attempting to circumvent fraud and national security system 
checks.”313 DHS OIG noted: 
308 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges. (OIG-14-112) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 2014). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
2014/OIG_14-112_Jul14.pdf.  
309 Ibid.  
310 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services’ Progress in Transformation. (OIG-12-12) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, November 2011). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-12_Nov11.pdf.  
311 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The Effects of USCIS 
Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers. (OIG-12-24) 





                                                 
We were informed that the risk analyzer will identify all aliases, which 
will provide greater protection for the immigration system. 
Transformation will provide access to data from the applicant, USCIS data 
systems, and any aliases discovered from other immigration and law 
enforcement data systems. The system will identify aliases much more 
efficiently than ISO review of paper files, according to a Transformation 
official.314 
As of July 2014, the “risk analyzer” has not been deployed. USCIS has “extended 
the timeline for its initial deployment of electronic capabilities”315 and “reduced the 
scope of the deployment.”316 Even in the absence of deploying an automated “risk 
analyzer,” USCIS has invested significant resources into USCIS ELIS.  
A reliable aggregate value of spending on USCIS ELIS is difficult to come by. 
DHS OIG reported obligations of more than $500 million between fiscal years 2008 and 
2011.317 Its review in 2014 noted costs of over $1.7 billion for a 6-year period.318 The 
White House IT Dashboard notes that the Agency spent $176.4 million for fiscal year 
2014 alone.319 USCIS furnished values for a required report known as the “Exhibit 300” 
with a “Total Cost” including government employee salaries of $569.5 million.320 
314 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The Effects of USCIS 
Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers. (OIG-12-24) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
OIG_12-24_Jan12.pdf. 
315 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services’ Progress in Transformation. (OIG-12-12) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, November 2011). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-12_Nov11.pdf.  
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Judicial Watch Blog Corruption Chronicles. “6 Years, $1.7 Bil Later DHS Visa System Deemed 
Failure.” Judicial Watch. August 11, 2014. http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2014/08/6-years-1-7-bil-
later-dhs-visa-system-deemed-failure/. (Accessed August 12, 2014). 
319 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “USCIS - Transformation.” https://www.itdashboard.gov/
investment?buscid=319. (Accessed August 2, 2014). 
320 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Exhibit 300: Capital Asset Summary, USCIS – Transformation. (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, July 2014). https://it-2014.itdashboard.gov//investment/exhibit300/pdf/024-
000003015.  
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Whatever the exact cost of the development and implementation of the USCIS 
ELIS system, the work of developing, testing, and deploying the originally intended “risk 
analyzer” tool or some similar automated tool will add to this investment.  
Opportunity cost 
The basic definition of “opportunity cost” is the “value of the next-highest-valued 
alternative”321 or the value of what a resource could be used for instead of its current use. 
The obligation of a significant amount of resources and funding towards the development 
of an automated tool for system and records check would preclude the use of those 
resources and funds for other reasons. The latest USCIS Fiscal Year Accomplishments 
Brochure (2012) notes a wide range of initiatives from developing and implementing 
procedures for the administrative relief program “Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals” (DACA), to launching the first phase of USCIS ELIS, as well as several 
humanitarian programs.322 The availability of resources for these and other initiatives at 
the Agency would be limited by their obligation towards the development of automation 
tools.  
3. Effects of Automation in Immigration Adjudications on National 
Security 
a. Benefits to National Security  
Recency and frequency of records checks 
Automation would offer a significant improvement in the recency and frequency 
of the records checks that are considered during an immigration adjudication. This would 
reduce risks of fraud or threats to public safety and national security. The public redacted 
version of the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual indicates that system checks must be 
conducted within 90 days of a decision on an application. If an adjudicator runs the 
321 David R. Henderson, “Opportunity Cost.” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. (Online: 
Library of Economics and Liberty, 2008). http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html  
322 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 





                                                 
manual checks, then issues a Request for Evidence (RFE), places the case in a pending 
status, and then revisits that case 88 days later, the results of the system checks would be 
valid to process the decision. Given the constant workload on USCIS adjudicators and the 
fact that rechecks are not required within 90 days, it is unlikely that the checks would be 
regularly reprocessed. This recency gap in information poses a significant risk to public 
safety and national security. If records checks were automated and results were returned 
quickly, rechecks could be conducted immediately before an adjudicator renders a 
decision. As an example, immediately before taking the oath of naturalization, candidates 
for citizenship must attest that since their last interview, they have not committed crimes 
or been arrested, per the Form N-445 “Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony.”323 This 
mini-interview is conducted on the site of a naturalization ceremony where adjudicators 
generally have no access to verify the information being attested. If automated records 
checks were available, the entire group of applicants could be rechecked immediately 
prior to naturalization, which could identify risks to public safety or national security. 
This benefit to national security is similar to the benefit provided by continuous 
evaluation (CE) in security clearances. 
Consistently checking all systems with programmable variations in aliases  
In a 2012 review of USCIS adjudications procedures, the DHS OIG noted 
significant challenges that adjudicators faced with manual system checks. DHS OIG 
noted that:  
Challenges in alias identification are compounded because USCIS uses 
cumbersome and outdated immigration data systems. Both USCIS 
employees and some law enforcement agency users express frustration 
with USCIS systems. Our recent report on overseas screening noted that 
information on foreign nationals is fragmented among 17 data systems. 
Officers must conduct labor-intensive, system-by-system checks to verify 
323 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Form N-445 “Notice of Naturalization Oath Ceremony.” http://www.ilw.com/forms/N445.pdf.  
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or eliminate each possible match to terrorist watch lists and other 
derogatory information.324 
Further, in a 2014 review of USCIS information technology investments, the DHS 
OIG noted that: 
USCIS staff members are not always sure of which systems to use or 
which systems are available to them to complete business processes. For 
example, staff members in some locations were not aware that they should 
be using the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) during the 
adjudication process. ADIS is a DHS Office of Biometric Identity 
Management system used to collect and maintain the arrival and departure 
information of non-U.S. citizens traveling to the U.S. A high level official 
in the field learned about the value of the system when a Fraud Detection 
and National Security supervisor brought it to the official’s attention.325  
Non-standard system use is a risk to national security. USCIS Officials 
interviewed by DHS OIG expressed concerned that “if every site is not using the same 
systems, applicants could travel to different field offices to receive different results.”326 
As demonstrated with the Secure Flight and ACES systems and discussed 
previously, automation offers improvements to consistency over manual system-by-
system checks on multiple aliases. Automation would reduce variability in procedures 
related to checking aliases. Further, automation would ensure that all systems are checked 
for every applicant, as a system can be designed to incorporate all relevant systems 
containing information on foreign nationals and internal records systems. These 
characteristics of automated systems offer improvements to national security related to 
consistency. 
324 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. The Effects of USCIS 
Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers. (OIG-12-24) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2012). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
OIG_12-24_Jan12.pdf. 
325 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges. (OIG-14-112) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 2014). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
2014/OIG_14-112_Jul14.pdf.  
326 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges. (OIG-14-112) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 2014). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
2014/OIG_14-112_Jul14.pdf.  
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Referring fraud and national security issues 
In a review conducted in 2008, DHS OIG noted that USCIS policies and 
procedures contained disincentives for ISOs to identify and refer fraud cases.327 The current 
referral process is labor-intensive. Given that certain Agency performance metrics rate ISOs 
on their productivity based on numerical formulas for expected case completions, ISOs might 
not be referring all suspected cases of fraud.328 Automation could ensure that any evidence 
of fraud or national security risks found in system checks were flagged and referred to an 
FDNS IO. There are certainly bases for fraud referrals not found in systems checks that 
ISOs may uncover during interview procedures, and automation would not necessarily 
affect these referrals. However, an automated system for system check referrals might 
also include tools to simplify other referral procedures. In either scenario, automation 
offers an improvement over current procedures.  
USCIS already has referral procedures for situations when serious threats to 
public safety or national security are identified in their investigations processes. 
Automation may offer the capacity to improve coordination with enforcement agencies or 
local law enforcement, as it has with Secure Flight.  
Incorporating more data 
ACES has been tested with the inclusion of as many as 40 systems, and it can be 
calibrated to include or exclude systems based on business rules determined by process 
experts. As previously noted, automation in immigration adjudications could enable 
consistent inclusion of all currently available systems. This alone offers improvements to 
inconsistent system checks. As demonstrated through ACES testing, when new data 
relevant to immigration adjudications becomes available, automation enables this data to 
be incorporated into the records checks.329 The inclusion of additional sources of 
327 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Review of the USCIS Benefit 
Fraud Referral Process (Redacted – Revised). (OIG-08-09) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 2008). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf.  
328 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Review of the USCIS Benefit 
Fraud Referral Process (Redacted – Revised). (OIG-08-09) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 2008). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-09_Apr08.pdf. 
329 Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team. “Security and Suitability Process Reform.” December 
2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/reports/joint_security_dec2008.pdf . 
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information could mean the corroboration of derogatory information and improve the 
quality of decisions. However, the inclusion of additional information into immigration 
adjudications would likely involve a change in policy and procedure and updates to 
privacy regulations and documents. 
Flexibility and uniformity 
As noted for both Secure Flight and ACES, automation offers flexibility in system 
calibration. This applies to its potential use in immigration adjudications, as well. An 
automated system supporting immigration adjudications could be quickly calibrated in 
response to an elevated threat environment based on policy or procedures changes. The 
new rules would be applied universally across all applicants as soon as the system was 
reprogrammed. While responses to threats or policies can be implemented in its absence, 
automation offers rapid response and uniform application, thus improving national 
security. 
Privacy and Information Security Controls 
Previously noted as a benefit to applicants, improvements to information security 
and privacy controls also benefit national security. Requiring adjudicators or IOs to 
access as many as 17 national security systems and additional records systems 
incorporates risks to information security and individual privacy. Utilizing an automated 
system that conducts queries without manual review by adjudicators reduces the risk of 
data exposure and deters internal abuse.  
Risk-Based Models 
As early as 2002, Lee S. Strickland and Jennifer Willard suggested the use of data 
mining and risk analyses to completely reengineer the immigration adjudications 
process.330 Rather than develop decision support tools to streamline current immigration 
adjudication procedures, they suggested a more radical approach to investigating 
applicants. They proposed using powerful data mining tools to develop risk profiles 
330 Lee S. Strickland and Jennifer Willard. “Reengineering the Immigration System: A Case for Data 
Mining and information Assurance to Enhance Homeland Security.” Bulletin of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology 29, no.1 (2002): 16–21. 
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based on applicant characteristics. This proposal to reengineer the immigration system is 
more drastic than simply automating existing procedures. However, they argued that 
rules-based procedures are inadequate for protecting national security from potential 
terrorists.331 These procedures for adjudication would utilize risk assessments now being 
used by Secure Flight to support expedited or enhanced pre-screening procedures.  
The use of advanced analytics and data mining tools to collect “positive” 
information on applicants, rather than simply running checks for “negative” information, 
is not possible without the use of automation and decision support tools. Employing this 
type of risk-based adjudications throughout USCIS would require significant policy 
analysis and regulation to implement. It might require an act of Congress. Full analysis of 
privacy and security issues would also be necessary.  
Risk-based investigations might offer the Agency additional operational 
efficiencies, as it has for TSA. These efficiencies and potential improvements to national 
security are only feasible with an automated system in place. 
b. Risks to National Security 
False documents and false identities 
As previously noted, issues with false identities and false documents pose a risk 
for aviation security, and automation does not improve it. There is a similar risk of the 
use of false documents in immigration applications, which also relies on the accuracy of 
the information that applicants submit. Many immigration applications require significant 
evidentiary support, and each piece of required evidence is an opportunity for an 
applicant to submit something fraudulent. Adjudicators are trained to look for signs of 
document fraud, but sophistication in falsifying documents can make them hard to detect 
for even experienced adjudicators.  
331 Lee S. Strickland and Jennifer Willard. “Reengineering the Immigration System: A Case for Data 
Mining and information Assurance to Enhance Homeland Security.” Bulletin of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology 29, no.1 (2002): 16–21. 
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Many immigration applications require the collection of biometrics such as 
photographs and fingerprints.332 Once these are collected, an applicant’s identity is at 
least consistent throughout the rest of the process. Certain immigration benefits require 
an interview, thus offering another opportunity for identify verification. USCIS recently 
implemented a verification tool called “Customer Identity Verification”333 which it uses 
whenever an applicant appears in person. Automated records checks in support of current 
immigration adjudication procedures would neither improve nor worsen the risk of 
document or identity fraud. 
However, automated records checks offer an opportunity to decrease the risk of 
document fraud with certain changes to the process. For documents or data that are 
produced or stored by the other agencies of the United States federal government, such as 
arrival or departure records from CBP, USCIS could circumvent document fraud 
opportunities by requesting direct access to the databases. Rather than requiring 
adjudicators to review possibly fraudulent documents submitted by applicants, an 
automated system could query the authoritative sources directly. This type of inter-
agency information sharing may be necessary to ensure national security and deter fraud 
and arguably falls under investigations exemptions to the Privacy Act. However, updates 
to privacy regulations might be required to support automated records checks or 
advanced analytics of applicant data. 
4. Findings 
The fundamental factors for evaluating the policy decision to implement 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures as outlined in the methodology 
for this analysis are: 
• expected benefits to stakeholders,  
332 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
“Photographs and Fingerprints.” May 3, 2010. http://www.uscis.gov/forms/file-my-application-online-e-
filing/photographs-and-fingerprints. (Accessed August 4, 2014). 
333 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
“USCIS Implements Customer Identity Verification at Field Offices.” September 19, 2013. 
http://www.uscis.gov/uscis-tags/unassigned/uscis-implements-customer-identity-verification-field-offices. 
(Accessed August 4, 2014). 
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• potential improvements in operational efficiency, and
• potential reduction of risks to national security.
The previous analysis shows that these factors could be substantially achieved by 
the development and implementation of automation tools for immigration adjudications. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM CONTEXT 
As with most new government activities that result from new laws or policies, the 
development, implementation, and operation of decision support tools for immigration 
adjudications will involve monetary and opportunity costs. Expenditures to support the 
automation of adjudications will require the endorsement, buy-in, participation, and 
cooperation of several essential stakeholders. 
This thesis demonstrates that the Agency could realize benefits for operational 
efficiency and national security by implementing automation, and these benefits remain 
valid even in the absence of immigration reform. It is important to consider the current 
context for immigration adjudications: at this time, Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
(CIR) is a significant factor in resource planning for the next several years for USCIS. 
Considering the implementation of automation is relevant in this context. 
As of this publication, an immigration reform bill has not been passed by 
Congress. An available benchmark for considering the impact of immigration reform can 
be found in the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act,” also known as S. 744,334 passed by the United States Senate in July 
2013. Many issues related to immigration reform are still up for debate, and until the 
United States House of Representatives or full Congress proposes another option, S. 744 
is the only available tool for analysis at this time.  
With a few exceptions, immigration benefit requests require applicants or 
petitioners to pay fees to process their applications. While a small number of USCIS 
directorates operate on budgets that are appropriated by Congress, revenues generated 
from application fees fund the majority of USCIS’s operations. In bill S. 744, 
$750,000,000335 is allocated to expand the employment verification system, “eVerify,” 
334 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.744, 113th Cong., 
1st sess. (2013). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s744es/pdf/BILLS-113s744es.pdf. 
335 Ibid. 
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which is operated by one of the appropriated directorates of USCIS.336 The bill also 
provides that a new benefit category be created and fees be collected with associated 
applications. USCIS could expect to recoup certain operational costs from the fees 
collected with these applications. However, S. 744 does not provide any up front funding 
for USCIS to expand its adjudication operations in advance of its implementation. Based 
on current estimates of the undocumented immigrant population in the United States, 
USCIS predicts an influx of applications that would triple the agency’s current workload 
when immigration reform passes. USCIS is aware of this oversight of advance 
operational funding. However, despite the projected increase in workload, the Agency 
may have limited incentive to implement significant operational changes now because it 
could leverage operational deficiencies for necessary funding. Compounding this is the 
fact that the political environment surrounding immigration reform remains uncertain. 
There are a few possible outcomes for the future of immigration adjudications. In 
one scenario, immigration reform or some presidential action will affect immigration 
policy, and USCIS will use existing manual processes for system and records checks. 
Workloads will increase for all officers, operational efficiency will decrease, and there 
will be significant impacts to customer service and national security. In another scenario, 
USCIS or the Congress will have the foresight to fund and implement automation as a 
decision support tool for the Agency to prepare for the additional workload. This thesis 
argues that automation as a decision support tool can improve national security even in 
the absence of future immigration reform legislation. However, given the cost and 
challenge of developing an automation tool, immigration legislation could certainly draw 
sufficient attention to motivate its implementation. 
B. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMATION 
1. Americans and Immigration Applicants 
The political environment of immigration adjudications involves a wide range of 
players. These include the American citizenry and millions of “future voters,” several 
336 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. “E-
Verify.” http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify. (Accessed July 23, 2014). 
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federal agencies and their leadership including USCIS, the union of employees at USCIS, 
and the Congress. In this space, those essential to championing the changes required to 
develop, implement, and use automation as a decision-support tool for immigration 
adjudications include USCIS Agency leadership, the Congress, and the union of USCIS 
employees. Those influential to implementing such a program include other federal 
agency partners. Those who are nominal or interchangeable in the process are the 
American citizenry, present and future. 
The American public is a direct beneficiary of any effort to improve the quality of 
immigration adjudications through operational efficiencies and the use of risk-based 
analytics. If immigration reform is considered a given, which it is not, the applicants for a 
new status created by CIR would also be direct beneficiaries of efficient procedures since 
they would not be able to exercise the benefits granted to them (lawful status and work 
permits) until their applications were processed. Those supporting the immigrant 
community, such as the large body of lawfully present Mexicans and Latin Americans, as 
well as voting citizens formerly from parts of the world largely represented in the 
undocumented population, are also nominal beneficiaries of operational efficiencies at 
USCIS.  
Processing times—how long it takes to process a particular benefit request—and 
production rates—how many decisions an office produces—are public indicators of 
Agency operational efficiency. When processing times become excessive, the results are 
public dissatisfaction and risks to national security in the form of insufficient 
investigations on applicants for the sake of speed. USCIS regularly publishes information 
related to processing times in order to address concerns from the public and especially 
from those that represent them. The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) 
has been tracking processing time reports from USCIS on its website since 1996.337 
While USCIS indicates that customer service is central to its mission, fast processing 
times are not a true goal. These processing issues could be used to leverage money from 
Congress, particularly if the Agency is expected to respond to new immigration 
337 American Immigration Lawyers Association, AILA InfoNet. “CSC Processing Time Reports.” 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=6740. (Accessed July 2, 2014). 
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legislation without advance or additional funding. Indeed, this is precisely the case with 
the version of the immigration reform bill, S.744, which passed the United States Senate. 
That being said, the present and future citizenry have little influence over the 
Agency’s decision to use or not to use automation as a decision-support tool. If 
processing times became excessive or if there were a significant national security event 
as a direct result of an incorrect adjudication due to insufficient investigations, the 
American public might voice concerns to representatives in Congress. As will be 
discussed later, Congress is an essential partner in implementing automation as a decision 
support tool. 
2. Other Federal Agencies 
Other federal agencies are influential to the decision to implement automation 
tools at USCIS. Some of the systems that immigration adjudicators must query to process 
a benefit request are “owned” by other agencies, such as the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) system, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, a 
part of the Department of Justice; or the Student & Exchange Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS), which is maintained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In order 
to fully automate background check queries for immigration adjudications, cooperation 
and technology investment will be required of these agencies. If the Congress requires the 
development and use of automation tools for immigration adjudications, building the 
technological interfaces will require these agencies to work together. In this scenario, 
successful relationships among these organizations will warrant prioritization.  
3. USCIS Leadership 
In order to support and fund the development of an automated system for 
adjudications, Agency leaders will need to understand the national security risks of 
current operations and the potential paralyzing impact of slow processing times that will 
result from a significantly increased workload at USCIS. As with the two cases analyzed 
in this thesis, both Secure Flight and ACES became prioritized only after major security 
issues resulted from poor operations. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (IRPTA) of 2004 was passed by Congress in part to enact several recommendations 
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of the 9/11 Commission Report. Though the population that will be eligible for benefits 
created by immigration reform may pose less risk to national security than others, it is 
important to realize that the increased adjudications workload will have an impact on all 
agency operations and all benefit request types. Investigations not conducted in a 
thorough or timely fashion may permit those who seek to harm us easier entry into our 
country. This will impact our national security. 
Backlogged cases are a customer service issue, as previously discussed. Indeed, a 
large Agency effort in 2006 known as the “Backlog Elimination Plan” specifically 
focused on reducing cases that were pending adjudication. In 2003, changes in 
adjudications procedures mandated additional background checks and expanded the 
range of applicants that were required to submit fingerprints and other biometrics in 
support of their applications.338 These operational changes resulted in a peak backlog of 
3.85 million cases in January 2004.339 Former Agency Director Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez 
made regular presentations concerning efforts to reduce the backlog to several 
Congressional committees. His last presentation on the subject included 
acknowledgement of “the thousands of USCIS employees who came in early, stayed late 
and worked weekends” to meet agency production goals without compromising “quality 
or integrity.”340 Agency employees working overtime completed all of this work 
manually. A backlog of 3.85 million cases represents a little more than half of the 
agency’s current workload of 6 to 7 million cases per year.  
An approximation of the workload impact of S.744 must take into consideration 
the compound nature of the process that would be created to support Lawful Prospective 
Immigrant (LPI) status, involving initial applications for status and work authorization, as 
well as status reapplications and citizenship applications as outlined in the Bill. The 
338 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Backlog Elimination Plan: Fiscal Year 2006, 3rd Quarter Update. (Washington, DC: Department of 





                                                 
initial influx of applications could be 11–12 million;341 however, the evidentiary 
requirements of LPI status and the supplementary application for employment 
authorization compound the issue of simply tripling receipts of applications. Furthermore, 
the Bill requires reapplication after 6 years, thus increasing the workload baseline. Per 
S.744, LPI become eligible to apply for citizenship after 10 years, and naturalized U.S. 
Citizens are then eligible to petition for family members to immigrate to the U.S. or 
adjust status to lawful permanent residents (LPR). Each of these procedures requires 
USCIS adjudication resources, thus supporting the prediction of a permanent increase in 
the Agency’s workload.  
Though using overtime resources was successful in 2004 for eliminating a 
backlog of an additional 50% of typical workload, it would have little effect on a growing 
backlog of this magnitude. Options for the Agency might include permanently increasing 
staffing levels or implementing process changes such as automation decision support 
tools. Both would involve significant approval procedures at the level of the Congress or 
White House. 
As discussed earlier, different immigration benefit types pose varying levels of 
adjudicative and processing burdens on the Agency. Depending on the complexity of the 
application, the evidentiary requirements, and other characteristics of any new status 
created by CIR, the workload impact will vary. Based on an evaluation of the 
requirements outlined in S.744, the LPI status would rate among the more complex 
“adjustment of status” applications as defined in section 245 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255.342  
4. The Congress 
Politics surrounding immigration reform are contentious. As a result, members of 
Congress and political organizations could impact the implementation of automation 
341 Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. “Population Decline of Unauthorized 
Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed.” Pew Research Hispanic Trends Report. September 23, 2013. 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-
reversed/. 
342 Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Code 8 (1952), § 1255. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title8/pdf/USCODE-2011-title8-chap12-subchapII-partV-sec1255.pdf . 
 110 
                                                 
tools at USCIS. Those who support immigration reform in general might support 
appropriations for operational improvements at USCIS to process the influx of 
applications. Those who oppose immigration reform might object to appropriations for 
operational improvements at USCIS in an effort to undermine the overall implementation 
of CIR. While it is feasible that USCIS could assume the responsibility for the 
development and deployment of automation tools to support immigration adjudications 
without an act of Congress, direct inclusion of USCIS operational changes in 
immigration reform legislation might ensure its success. 
5. Union of USCIS Employees 
The Union of USCIS employees is a significant stakeholder in the implementation 
of automation tools. Funding, development, and implementation of automation decision 
support tools are wasted if the tool is not utilized. At USCIS, some past attempts to 
implement large-scale technologies to improve agency operations have faced opposition 
from the employee union. 
Any changes to job duties for immigration officers—those who review and 
adjudicate immigration benefit requests—must be negotiated or bargained. Agency 
culture related to job performance metrics, job requirements and reviews, and adjudicator 
caseload is regularly a topic of union discussions. The Union successfully prevented the 
implementation of certain elements of the Enterprise Performance Analysis System 
(ePas) in 2011 and again in 2012.343 Current Agency efforts to develop and deploy an 
electronic case management system and adjudications platform called “USCIS ELIS” 
(Electronic Immigration System)344 face regular renegotiations on bargaining 
agreements.345 
343 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Office of Performance and Quality. “OPQ News.” April 4, 2013. http://connect.uscis.dhs.gov/news/
Documents/uscis_today_OPQNews.htm.  
344 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
“USCIS ELIS.” April 16, 2014. http://www.uscis.gov/uscis-elis.  
345 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges. (OIG-14-112) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 2014). http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
2014/OIG_14-112_Jul14.pdf.  
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However, immigration reform might provide an opportunity for the Agency to 
leverage burdensome workloads to implement decision support tools. Mr. Kenneth 
Palinkas, the president of the American Federation of Government Employees Council 
119, which represents officers and staff at USCIS, criticized S. 744 stating that it “will 
damage public safety and national security” because it was unlikely that immigration 
officers would be afforded the appropriate time for “diligent case review” and “proper 
investigation into red flags.”346 Labor unions are motivated by job security and pay 
security. Given the expected increase in workload with CIR, job security becomes moot, 
and the Agency’s task of negotiating the implementation of decision support tools 
becomes easier. 
Though this thesis demonstrates that the implementation of a decision support 
tool in the absence of CIR would help improve immigration officers’ capacity to conduct 
“diligent case reviews” and “proper investigations,” it is likely that the union would view 
such a tool as a threat to officer job security. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The fundamental factors for evaluating the policy decision to implement 
automation tools for immigration adjudication procedures—expected benefits to 
stakeholders, improvements to operational efficiency, and the reduction of risks to 
national security—have been demonstrated in the preceding analysis. Therefore, this 
thesis recommends their development. 
1) USCIS should develop automation tools for immigration adjudications 
regardless of the status of immigration reform or other immigration policy changes. 
As discussed, there are a few possible outcomes for the future of immigration 
adjudications. Generally speaking, there are two variables to consider when evaluating 
the need for automation tools for immigration: changes in policy or procedure and 
changes in workload. Policy and procedure can be affected on a large scale by external 
346 American Federation of Government Employees Council 119. “USCIS Union President: 
Lawmakers Should Oppose Senate Immigration Bill, Support Immigration Service Officers.” May 20, 
2013. http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/Reform0520USCISCouncilLet.pdf. 
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factors like acts of Congress or the President, or on a smaller scale by internal factors like 
Agency leadership decisions. Changes in workload can be affected by many external 
factors, including the availability of new benefit types per new law or executive order; 
international crises (war, political unrest, natural disasters, or other) that affect 
immigration patterns; seasonal or cyclical increases in application receipts; and many 
others. Each of these factors carries an inherent probability or likelihood which itself may 
change over time due to external factors. Over the course of existence of USCIS since 
2003, each of these external or internal factors has come to pass in one way or another. 
Each instance has had an operational impact on the Agency and an effect on national 
security. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, even in the absence of specific 
probability rates for each possible factor, something external will affect operations at 
USCIS. This thesis has shown that automated tools to support adjudication and 
investigative procedures can improve operational responsiveness to such factors. For 
USCIS, operational efficiency and responsiveness support meeting its goals, as outlined 
in Mission 3 of the QHSR: to effectively and efficiently administer immigration laws; 
provide prompt and accurate adjudications; prevent fraud, abuse, and exploitation; 
eliminate systemic vulnerabilities; and prevent the entry of criminals or dangerous 
foreign nationals.347 
2) If the Congress or the President makes changes to immigration policy, funding 
specifically to support the development of automation tools at USCIS should be 
allocated. 
Given the cost and the challenge of developing an automation tool, resource 
constraints at USCIS will limit progress towards its implementation. Current efforts to 
develop an electronic application, a case management system, and the adjudications 
platform called “USCIS ELIS” under the Transformation Program are already 
347 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (QHSR). (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, February. 2010). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf.  
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significantly behind original plans, both in schedule and budget.348 While automated 
records checks could reasonably fit into the development of USCIS ELIS, the funding 
and resources to build it properly would need to be evaluated for priority among all other 
Agency information technology efforts.  
As previously noted, operational inefficiencies or customer service problems that 
are likely to arise due to the expected workload impact of CIR provide the Agency with 
leverage for additional funding. However, an operational efficiency gap of this magnitude 
would pose a significant national security risk. Therefore, Congress or the White House 
should fund the development of an automation tool for immigration adjudications in 












348 White House, Federal IT Dashboard. “USCIS ELIS.” https://www.itdashboard.gov/
investment?buscid=319.  (Accessed August 8, 2014). 
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